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I. Introduction
Take it from someone who works in government, public employ-
ers do not always welcome criticism from their employees. An em-
ployee's attack on her superior's competence is often thought to erode
workplace discipline. Harsh criticism of a government office's per-
formance by its employees can be a public relations nightmare. Nev-
ertheless, public employers are bound by the First Amendment, which
ordinarily precludes government from punishing persons for the con-
tent of their speech. Yet, few would argue that public employees have
the same right to criticize government managers as the public at large.
Indeed, in Connick v. Myers,' the United States Supreme Court held
that the First Amendment did not protect Myers, a public employee
who had solicited the views of her colleagues on how the office func-
tioned, because her speech did not touch on matters of public concern.
At one time public employees could easily determine the protec-
tions the First Amendment offered them. As Justice Holmes opined
when rejecting the right of a public employee to criticize his employer
and keep his job: "[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."2
The Supreme Court, however, has rejected this formulation for nearly
half a century, but at the same time has failed to come up with an
alternative that is as pithy or as easy to administer.
The Court's last two forays into this area illustrate how unsatis-
factory its efforts have been to accommodate the rights of public em-
ployees and the legitimate interests of their employers. In Rankin v.
McPherson,3 for example, the Court sought to invalidate censorship
by a public employer, while remaining faithful to the Connick rule
that public employees have First Amendment protection only when
they speak on a matter of "public concern." It protected a secretary's
casual comment to a co-worker that she hoped someone would assas-
sinate President Reagan, because it was a matter of "public concern,"4
as if the public cared about such an offhand comment. Hence, the
1. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
2. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
3. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
4. Id. at 386-87.
Court branded her employer's position, that a law enforcement
agency risked losing the public's confidence if it kept persons who
condone politically-motivated murder on its payroll, as constitution-
ally impermissible.5
Yet, in Waters v. Churchill,6 the Court granted a comment of
seemingly greater concern no constitutional protection. In Waters, a
nurse expressed her view that the policies of the obstetrics department
(at a public hospital) were endangering the quality of care. The ma-
jority agreed that the nurse could be fired for expressing honestly held
opinions about the department to a colleague seeking advice about
whether to transfer to that department, even if hospital policy did not
forbid nurses from offering each other advice. This holding provoked
Justice Stevens, not usually one to indulge in overheated rhetoric, to
begin his dissent by writing: "This is a free country."7
The evolution of the law in this area has been unsatisfactory for
both employers and employees. The Connick public concern test al-
lows judges to decide which topics are of proper public concern and
which disputes should remain in the workplace. This test seemingly
confers upon judges censorial power that the First Amendment ordi-
narily forbids: the power to discriminate against speech on the basis of
its content. In all other areas of First Amendment jurisprudence, "the
marketplace of ideas," not the courts' or government officials' views,
determines what matters may engage the public's concern. Moreover,
the indeterminacy of this public concern test creates a "chilling effect"
on speech. Ordinarily courts invalidate vague and overbroad regula-
tions of speech in order to address the "chilling effect" problem. The
courts, however, not only permit employers to engage in ad hoc judg-
ments about whether an employee's speech amounts to cause for dis-
charge, but also allow them to impose discipline under an imprecise
public concern test.
In the following discussion, I first summarize the rules regulating
speech of public employees. Second, I explain why those rules create
serious doctrinal and practical problems. Third, I explore the reasons
why Connick's public concern test is likely to diminish in importance,
even if the Court avoids its outright repudiation. Doctrines more
firmly rooted in general First Amendment principles are likely to re-
place the public concern test. Indeed, Connick is an obstacle to clarity
in this area. Restrictions on employee speech should be recognized
5. See id. at 390-92.
6. 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
7. Id. at 694 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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for what they are: efforts by management to ensure that what employ-
ees write or say do not prevent management from implementing its
own policies at the workplace. Such regulations should be considered
constitutionally unobjectionable when they require an employee to do
her job consistent with office policies, rather than when they attempt
to coerce her ideological conformity in the workforce. Finally, I dis-
cuss why these restrictions should be assessed under the test gov-
erning incidental restrictions on speech. In fact, the Court was headed
in that direction before it took a wrong turn in Connick. Applying the
doctrine governing incidental restrictions on speech will clarify this
area of the law, and help make sense of many of the problems em-
ployers face in this area, such as how to regulate racist and sexist
speech in the workplace without violating the First Amendment.
H. The Doctrine
Although the Supreme Court long ago rejected Justice Holmes'
view that public employees can be penalized for exercising their First
Amendment rights,' the question whether public employees may en-
gage in speech critical of management did not reach the Court until
1968, in Pickering v. Board of Education.9
A. Pickering and Its Progeny
Marvin Pickering, a schoolteacher, was fired from his job for a
critical letter he had written to a local newspaper (just after a tax in-
crease proposed by the school board had been defeated in a referen-
8. Justice Holmes' view was the law for many years. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Los Angeles Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951);
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S.
396 (1930); Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882). The Court steadily eroded Justice
Holmes' view with a series of decisions that held that public employment cannot be denied
because of an applicant's previous political affiliations. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 902 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 221 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960), the Court went a step further by invalidating a require-
ment that public school teachers periodically disclose the organizations to which they be-
longed or had made a contribution. Finally, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967), the Court interred Holmes' view when it invalidated two statutes prohibiting hiring
or retention of employees of educational institutions who belonged to identified "subver-
sive" organizations or who make "treasonable or seditious" statements, see id. at 597-610.
See generally Cynthia K. Y. Lee, Comment, Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A
Comment on the Public Concern Requirement, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1109, 1112-15 (1988); Note,
Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1650-60 (1984).
9. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
dum).1 Pickering's letter criticized the board for unwise spending of
prior tax increases, misleading the public about the need for the in-
crease, and attempting to prevent teachers from publicly opposing or
criticizing the proposed tax increase."
The Supreme Court evaluated Pickering's dismissal under a bal-
ancing test, stating that "[t]he problem in any case is to arrive at a
balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in comment-
ing upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it per-
forms through its employees."' 2 The Court saw no need to dismiss
Pickering in order to preserve a harmonious work environment since
Pickering's statements were "in no way directed towards any person
with whom [he] would normally be in contact in the course of his daily
work as a teacher."' 3 Furthermore, the Court rejected the board's ar-
gument that Pickering's disagreement with the board's views on
school funding provided sufficient reason to discipline him. It de-
clared that "the question whether a school system requires additional
funds is a matter of legitimate public concern on which the judgment
of the school administration, including the School Board, cannot, in a
society that leaves such questions to popular vote, be taken as conclu-
sive."' 4 It also noted that to the extent that Pickering's letter con-
tained errors of fact, "[t]he Board could easily have rebutted
[Pickering's] errors by publishing the accurate figures itself."' 5 The
Court held that Pickering could not be discharged for making false
statements unless he did so intentionally or with reckless disregard for
the truth.16
In the cases following Pickering, the Court expanded the protec-
tions for public employees who criticized their employers. In Perry v.
Sindermann,'7 for example, the Court invalidated the termination,
without a hearing, of an untenured junior college professor fired for
publicly criticizing the policies of the college system that employed
10. See id. at 566-67.
11. See id. at 566.
12. Id. at 568.
13. Id at 569-70.
14. Id. at 571.
15. Id. at 572.
16. See id. at 573-75. For this point, the Court relied on New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), in which the Court held that the First Amendment limits the
circumstances under which liability for defamation can be imposed.
17. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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him.' 8 Similarly, in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Educa-
tion v. Doyle, 9 the Court held that an untenured teacher could not be
dismissed for having disclosed to a radio station the substance of a
memorandum that his principal had sent teachers imposing a dress
and appearance code. The Court stated that Doyle's rights had been
violated since "[t]here is no suggestion by the Board that Doyle vio-
lated any established policy, or that its reaction to his communication
to the radio station was anything more than an ad hoc response to
Doyle's action in making the memorandum public."'2
Moreover, in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dis-
trict,2 ' the Court expanded Pickering to reach even nonpublic state-
ments made at the workplace of public employees. The Court held
that a teacher could not be fired for having criticized some of the dis-
trict's policies as racially discriminatory during a series of private
meetings with her principal.22 The Court concluded that First Amend-
ment rights are not "lost to the public employee who arrange[d] to
communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his
views before the public."'  Thus, from Pickering to Givhan, the Court
consistently expanded the First Amendment rights of public employ-
ees without a single dissenting vote.
B. Connick's Public Concern Test
The Court's unanimity ended, however, with the 5-4 decision in
Connick v. Myers.24 Sheila Myers was an assistant district attorney, in
New Orleans, for five and a half years.' Her superiors informed her
that she was to be transferred to a new assignment.26 Myers opposed
18. Sindermann testified before legislative committees and had made other statements
advocating that the junior college at which he taught should become a four-year institution,
a position that the regents running the system opposed. See id. at 594, 595. The regents
eventually decided not to renew Sindermann's contract, allegedly on grounds of "insubor-
dination." See id.
19. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
20. Id. at 284. The Court remanded the case to determine whether the school district
did not renew Doyle's contract because of his protected speech or for other reasons. The
district court had ordered Doyle reinstated with backpay based on a finding that his pro-
tected speech had played a "substantial part" in the board's decision not to rehire him, and
the court of appeals had affirmed on this basis. See id. at 283. The Supreme Court rejected
this approach, concluding that the board was entitled to an opportunity to prove that it
would not have rehired Doyle even absent his protected speech. See id. at 287.
21. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
22. See id. at 412-13.
23. Id. at 415-16.
24. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
25. See id. at 140.
26. See id.
the transfer.27 She circulated a questionnaire soliciting the views of
her colleagues "concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the
need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors,
and whether employees felt pressured to work in political cam-
paigns."' The district attorney subsequently fired her for her
actions.29
Justice White, writing for the Court,3" observed that an em-
ployee's speech about "internal office matters" was not "upon a mat-
ter of 'public concern,' as the term was used in Pickering."'" He
reasoned that Pickering and cases following it were rooted in the
"rights of public employees to participate in public affairs. '3 2 But
"[w]hen employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,
government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their of-
fices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the
First Amendment."33
According to the Court, the question of whether Myers' "speech
addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the con-
tent, form, and context of a given statement."34 Myers' questions re-
garding workplace morale and policies failed this test because they did
not seek to "inform the public that the District Attorney's Office was
not discharging its governmental responsibilities," nor "bring to light
actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of
Connick and others."3 One item on her questionnaire, however,
whether employees "feel pressured to work in political campaigns on
behalf of office supported candidates," did satisfy the "public con-
cern" test.36 It raised issues about potential office violations of "fun-
damental constitutional rights" and implicated the public's concern
27. See id. at 140-41.
28. Id. at 141 (footnote omitted).
29. District Attorney Connick informed Myers that he was terminating her because of
her refusal to accept the transfer. See id. at 141 He also told he considered her distribution
of the questionnaire an act of insubordination. See id. Connick particularly objected to
the question which inquired whether employees "had confidence in and would rely on the
word" of various superiors in the office, and to a question concerning pressure to work in
political campaigns, which he felt would be damaging if discovered by the press. Id.
30. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined Justice
White's opinion. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 138 (1983).
31. Id. at 143.
32. Id. at 144-45.
33. Id. at 146.
34. Id at 147-48.
35. Id. at 148.
36. Id. at 149.
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about whether public offices require "meritorious performance rather
than political service."37 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the
Pickering balancing test weighed against Myers because of the poten-
tially disruptive effects of the questionnaire. According to the Court,
an employer need not "allow events to unfold to the extent that the
disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is
manifest before taking action."3 The questionnaire distracted Myers
and her colleagues from their duties. Although she "did not violate
announced office policy, the fact that Myers, unlike Pickering, exer-
cised her rights to speech at the office supports Connick's fears that
the functioning of his office was endangered."39
Justice Brennan's dissent parted company with the majority at
every turn.40 First, Justice Brennan argued that the majority's reliance
on the fact that Myers' questionnaire was distributed at the workplace
was inconsistent with Givhan.41 Second, he maintained that Myers's
efforts to determine the state of morale at the district attorney's office
implicated matters of public concern.4' Finally, in light of the district
court's findings that Myers did not violate any office policy nor actu-
ally disrupt office-work, he believed that the Pickering balance fa-
vored upholding her First Amendment claim.4 3
The difficulty of applying the Connick "public concern" test is
made plain by Rankin v. McPherson.' Ardith McPherson, a 19-year-
old clerical employee at a county constable's office, heard a radio re-
port during work hours of the attempted assassination of President
Reagan. She remarked, to a co-worker, that she was not surprised at
the attempt in light of the President's policies, and added "if they go
for him again, I hope they get him."'45 . .Constable Rankin learned of
the remark and subsequently fired her.46
37. Id.
38. Id. at 151-52 (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 153 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Court observed that the
questionnaire was written in the context of Myers' proposed transfer. Thus, when an em-
ployee's speech arises from, and regards a workplace dispute, "additional weight must be
given to the supervisor's view that the employee has threatened the authority of the em-
ployer to run the office." Id.
40. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan's dissent. See id.
at 156 (Brennan, J. , dissenting)
41. See id. at 159-60 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. See id. at 161-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. See id at 166-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
45. Id. at 381 (footnote omitted).
46. See id. at 381-82. McPherson had admitted to Constable Rankin that she had
made the remark, but added that she "'didn't mean anything by it."' See id. at 382.
The majority (the four dissenters in Connick and Justice Powell)
first held that McPherson's comment was protected under the public
concern test.4 7 The Court reasoned that it did not amount to a threat
to kill the President and was made in the context of expressing her
view of the President's policies.48 The Court, applying Pickering, then
"balance[d] McPherson's interest in making her statement against 'the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees."' 4 9 In the Court's
view, the balance favored McPherson because there was "no evidence
that [her comment] interfered with the efficient functioning of the of-
fice."' 0 Moreover, because an employee with only clerical responsibil-
ities made the comment privately, the constable's office was not
discredited."'
In dissent, Justice Scalia claimed that the only reason the public
would be "concerned" about McPherson's comment is because it
amounted to a public employee's endorsement of assassination.52
Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's balancing, stating that
"[a]s a law enforcement officer, the Constable obviously has a strong
47. See id. at 386-87.
48. The Court reasoned:
The statement was made in the course of a conversation addressing the policies of
the President's administration. It came on the heels of a news bulletin regarding
what is certainly a matter of heightened public attention: an attempt on the life of
the President. While a statement that amounted to a threat to kill the President
would not be protected by the First Amendment, the District Court concluded,
and we agree, that McPherson's statement did not amount to a threat punishable
under 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) ... or 18 U.S.C. § 2385 ... or, indeed, that could prop-
erly be criminalized at all. .. . The inappropriate or controversial character of a
statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public
concern.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
49. Id. at 388 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).
50. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 389 (1987). In his testimony, Constable
Rankin conceded that "the possibility of interference with the functions of the Constable's
office had not been a consideration.., and that he did not even inquire whether the
remark had disrupted the work of the office." Id. (footnote omitted).
51. See id. The Court added: "Where, as here, an employee serves no confidential,
policy-making, or public contact role, the danger to the agency's successful functioning
from that employee's private speech is minimal." IaL at 390-91.
52. Id. at 396-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia endorsed the "public concern"
test, See id. at 395. Much of his dissent, however, criticized its application. See, e.g., id. at
398 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining that "Itihe public would be 'concerned' about a state-
ment threatening to blow up the local federal building or demanding a $1 million extortion
payment, yet that kind of 'public concern' does not entitle such a statement to any First
Amendment protection at all.").
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interest in preventing statements by any of his employees approving,
or expressing a desire for, serious, violent crimes."'53
More recently, the Court revisited the public concern and balanc-
ing tests in Waters v. Churchill.54 Cheryl Churchill worked as a nurse
in the obstetrics department of a public hospital.55 During a dinner
break, she shared her negative views of the staffing policies in that
department with a colleague who was considering transferring to ob-
stetrics.56 Churchill's recollection of the conversation differed from
that of her colleague. While her colleague thought that Churchill had
said "unkind and inappropriate things" about her supervisor, Church-
ill claimed that she had said only that departmental policies were "im-
peding nursing care.""7 The Seventh Circuit had held that a trial was
required to determine what Churchill had actually said and whether it
was constitutionally protected.5
Justice O'Connor, writing for a four-justice plurality,59 saw her
task as deciding what procedures employers must use when applying
the "substantive First Amendment standards" enunciated in Con-
nick.6" She concluded that the public concern and balancing tests that
the Court had applied in Connick were justified by the legitimate in-
terest in securing an "agency's effective operation."'" A rule permit-
ting juries to decide whether an employee has said something that is
likely to impair workplace efficiency would give insufficient weight to
that interest. Juries, bound by the rules of evidence, can only consider
particular types of information, whereas employers are entitled to
"rely on hearsay, on past similar conduct, on their personal knowledge
of people's credibility, and on other factors that the judicial process
ignores."'62 Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor concluded that courts may
not "apply the Connick test only to the facts as the employer thought
them to be, without considering the reasonableness of the employer's
53. Id. at 399 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54. 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
55. See id. at 664.
56. See id. at 664-66.
57. Id. at 665-66. Three other witnesses had overheard the conversation; two agreed
with Churchill's recounting and the third with her colleague's. See id.
58. See id. at 667-68.
59. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined Justice
O'Connor's opinion. Id. at 664.
60. See id. at 669. In support of her view that the First Amendment imposed proce-
dural and well as substantive limitations on the freedom of public employers to terminate
employees for their speech, Justice O'Connor noted that the Court had frequently imposed
special procedural rules for "proceedings that may penalize protected speech." Id.
61. Id. at 675.
62. Id. at 675-76.
conclusions."63 At least when "an employment action is based on
what an employee supposedly said, and a reasonable supervisor would
recognize that there is a substantial likelihood that what was actually
said was protected," public employers are constitutionally required to
perform a reasonable investigation before taking action against an
employee.64
According to Justice Scalia's concurrence, however, the First
Amendment only precludes employer "hostility" to protected speech,
not mere employer "negligence" in investigating reports about unpro-
tected conduct. 65 Justice Stevens' dissent rejected the plurality's con-
clusion that an employee must prove the employer's bad faith or
negligence to establish that she had been punished for protected
speech. He argued that Churchill's evidence that her speech was pro-
tected entitled her to trial on her First Amendment claim. 6 In Justice
Stevens's view, "before firing a public employee for her speech, man-
agement [should] get its facts straight. 67
I1. The Problem
Connick instructed the courts to evaluate "the content, form, and
context of a given statement. ' 68 Connick created categories of em-
ployee speech, each defined by reference to content, and afforded
each varying levels of protection.69 First, speech "upon matters only
of personal interest" is, "absent the most unusual circumstances," un-
protected.7° Second, speech that "touch[es] upon matters of public
63. Id. at 677.
64. Id. Justice O'Connor also concluded that the investigation had been reasonable
because the hospital's president met with Churchill and had all witnesses interviewed
before deciding to terminate Churchill. See id. at 679-80. Justice O'Connor added that
Churchill's employer could reasonably conclude that her comments about the obstetrics
department were unprotected. Id. at 667. Without deciding whether these comments were
"speech on matters of public concern," Justice O'Connor wrote that "the potential disrup-
tiveness of the speech as reported was enough to outweigh whatever First Amendment
value it might have had." Id. at 680. Justice O'Connor nevertheless thought that remand
was necessary, because Churchill had adduced evidence that the actual motivation for her
dismissal was her criticisms of hospital policy. See id. at 681-82.
65. See id. at 688-89. Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's opin-
ion. Id. at 686.
66. See id. at 695-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun joined Justice Steven's
dissent. Id. at 694.
67. Id. at 699 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. 461 U.S. at 147-48. See also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384-85 (1987).
69. See Risa L. Lieberwitz, Freedom of Speech in Public Sector Employment: The
Deconstitutionalization of the Public Sector Workplace, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 597, 642-48
(1986).
70. 461 U.S. at 147.
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concern in only a most limited sense" and is "accurately characterized
as an employee grievance concerning internal office policy" is unpro-
tected when an employer "reasonably believe[s]" that it will disrupt
the workplace. 1 Third, if the public employer seeks to regulate an
employee's speech that "more substantially involve[s] matters of pub-
lic concern," then the employee must make a stronger showing of ac-
tual disruption in the workplace.7" Finally, an employee who "speaks
out as a citizen on a matter of general concern, not tied to a personal
employment dispute," acquires the same constitutional protection as a
member of the public.73 Evaluating workplace grievances under this
categorical approach, without requiring employers to establish some
legitimate interest for penalizing the speech at issue, is troubling for a
number of reasons.
A. The Public Concern Test and the Problem of Content
Discrimination
Ironically, the public concern test requires courts to do something
that the First Amendment is ordinarily thought to forbid: discrimi-
nate between protected and unprotected speech on the basis of con-
tent. The Court consistently explains in other types of First
Amendment cases how content-based regulation is particularly sus-
pect because it allows the government to censor disfavored speech or
ideas. Therefore, such regulation, absent at least a compelling govern-
mental interest and a narrowly tailored means to achieve that end, is
ordinarily forbidden.74 But Connick does not require either a compel-
71. Id. at 154. No evidence of actual disruption in the workplace is required when the
speech falls into the second category. Id. at 151-52.
72. See id. at 152.
73. See id. at 148 n.8. The example that the Court gave was "Givhan's right to protest
racial discrimination." Id. One would think that Rankin v. McPherson would fall into this
category of speech as well, but no member of the Court, with the possible exception of
Justice Powell, seemed to have treated the case that way. 483 U.S. at 393 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
74. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995); Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-43 (1994); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377,382 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 115-16 (1991); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); City of Los Angeles v.
Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488,496 (1986); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S.
171, 177 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 462-63 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1975); Police
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). See generally 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN
E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.47(a)
(1992); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-3, 12-8 (2d ed.
1988); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI.
L. REv. 20 (1975); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46
ling governmental interest or a narrow means to achieve the desired
end.
Obviously, as the Court explained in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
"the prohibition against content discrimination... is not absolute."
75
In fact, the Court has tolerated a number of forms of content discrimi-
nation without applying strict scrutiny.76 Even the particular form of
content discrimination embraced in Connick is not unique to the
speech of public employees. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 7 the Court held that the First Amendment permits
awards of presumed or punitive damages in defamation actions absent
a showing of actual malice when the plaintiff is not a public figure and
the false statement involves no matter of "public concern. '78 The case
for tolerating at least some content discrimination in public employ-
ment seems particularly strong. Consider, for example, insubordinate
speech, which even the dissenters in Connick thought lacked First
Amendment protection.79  There is, of course, no way to evaluate
whether speech is insubordinate without considering its content.8"
(1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 189 (1983); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 615 (1991).
75. 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992).
76. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, supra note ___ § 12-18; Daniel A. Farber, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980); Martin
H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113
(1981); Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L.
RPv. 203 (1982); John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1304-11
(1993).
77. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
78. See id. at 757-61 (plurality opinion); see id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the
judgment); see id. at 774 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). See also Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 16 (1990); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S.
767,774 (1986).
79. 461 U.S. at 163 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. Professor Robert Post has made just this point:
[W]ithin government institutions the distinction between permissible and imper-
missible speech routinely and necessarily turns on content. School boards, for
example, characteristically instruct teachers that they are to use one curriculum
rather than another; superiors characteristically instruct subordinates that they
are to support at staff meetings one position rather than another; ... generals
characteristically instruct colonels that they are to formulate one kind of defen-
sive plan rather than another. The management of speech within government
institutions is thus an exception to the Court's often stated principle that "the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression be-
cause of its message, its ideas, its subject, or its content."
Robert C. Post, The Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 169,
197-98 (quoting Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)). See also Robert C. Post,
Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34
UCLA. L. Rnv. 1713, 1771-73 (1987).
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Connick's public concern test, however, authorizes what is ordi-
narily thought to be a particularly odious type of content discrimina-
tion: viewpoint discrimination. Absent the most compelling
circumstances, discrimination against disfavored ideas or viewpoints is
almost never tolerated under the First Amendment.' The public con-
cern test, however, singles out the expression of public employee's
views about workplace grievances for disfavored treatment, even if
their views are expressed discreetly, politely, and consistently with le-
gitimate managerial prerogatives. 8 2 Connick's public concern test al-
lows public employers to prevent workers opposed to management's
workplace policies from speaking their minds, even if the workers do
so in a non-disruptive manner. Under Connick, if the speech relates
only to a workplace grievance, a court will not even consider the dis-
ruptiveness of speech under the Pickering balancing test. In fact,
under that balancing test, a workplace grievance that implicates mat-
ters of public concern is unprotected as long as the employer reason-
ably believes that it will be disruptive. That is both content and
viewpoint discrimination. Connick clearly disfavors the expression of
employee views about workplace grievances.
The public concern test the Court adopted in Dun & Bradstreet
provides a useful contrast to how it applied that same test to public
employees. In Dun & Bradstreet, the Court disadvantaged only speech
directed at a business audience that contained errors of fact about the
financial condition of a business.83 Dun & Bradstreet placed no identi-
fiable viewpoint at a disadvantage, at least not in any obvious way;
rather it raised the costs to those who compile factual information for
business audiences by exposing them to punitive damages for negli-
gent mistakes of fact.84 Under Connick, however, the views of those
likely to disapprove of the way public institutions are run receive sig-
nificantly truncated constitutional protection.
81. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-29; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 642-43 (1994); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
393-94 (1993); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
82. 461 U.S. at 148-49.
83. 472 U.S. at 761-63.
84. Thus far, the Court has not expanded Dun & Bradstreet's limitation on the scope
of First Amendment protection for defamatory speech beyond the context of factual errors
about a business in speech directed at those seeking accurate information about the state
of that business. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991); Milkovich
v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990); Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Con-
naughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Philadel-
phia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
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The argument that could reconcile a prohibition on workplace
grievances with the ordinary rules governing content and viewpoint
discrimination is tortured at best. It goes something like this: expres-
sion of workplace grievances are punished not because of the idea or
viewpoint they express, but rather because they threaten a breakdown
in workplace discipline and order. But if a comment is not of public
concern, it is unprotected regardless of its potential to disrupt the
workplace.
Moreover, the Court's reliance on the effects of workplace griev-
ances on workplace efficiency cannot in the end square its proscrip-
tion with the rule against content discrimination. The Court has
announced that the listener's reaction to speech is not considered a
content-neutral basis for regulation.85 Thus, governmental fear of its
employees' reaction to speech is not an appropriate basis for that
speech's proscription. This rule, therefore, proscribes reliance on the
effects of workplace grievances as a basis for their regulation. If the
ordinary rules of content discrimination are applied to public employ-
ees, then, a supervisor's outrage at insubordinate language (even with
a justified fear that other employees will be influenced by an office
rebel) would not qualify as a content-neutral basis for regulation.
What is more, the Court seems to think that the rule about con-
tent discrimination does apply to public employers. In City of
Madison, Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Commission,86 for example, the Court held that the First
Amendment protected a teacher's comments at a school board meet-
ing about a "fair share" agreement that his union had proposed re-
quiring all teachers to pay union dues.87 The state labor board had
concluded that the school board had committed an unfair labor prac-
tice by permitting the teacher to address it on a subject committed to
the collective bargaining process, but the Court invalidated the state
labor board's decision as impermissible content discrimination against
those views that opposed the fair share agreement. 8 In light of this
85. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2342-43 (1997); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 394;
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
at 321-22.
86. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
87. Id. at 175-76.
88. The Court wrote:
To permit one side of a debatable public question to have a monopoly in expres-
sing its views to the government is the antithesis of constitutional guarantees.
Whatever its duties as an employer, when the board sits in public meetings to
conduct public business and hear the views of citizens, it may not be required to
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decision, Connick's authorization of content-discrimination in the
public workforce is especially puzzling.
B. The Troubling Constitutional Status of Workplace Grievances
Even if one is persuaded that some measure of content, and even
viewpoint, discrimination is necessary in the public workplace, why
use a public concern test that renders workplace grievances automati-
cally unprotected? Speech about conditions in a private employer's
workplace, for example, has long been considered constitutionally
protected.89 Connick itself acknowledged that workplace grievances
amount to "speech" within the ambit of the First Amendment; thus,
the Court expressly recognized that workplace grievances were not a
category of speech "totally beyond the protection of the First Amend-
ment ... such as obscenity."9 Perhaps an employee's workplace
gripes can be considered "low-value," like indecent speech. Even reg-
ulation of indecent speech, however, requires heightened judicial scru-
tiny because of the risk that it reflects governmental hostility to
particular ideas or viewpoints. 91 Under Connick, speech that fails the
public concern test receives no judicial protection at all, even if the
employer's reaction is motivated by hostility to the ideas or view-
points expressed rather than by any reasonable fear of workplace
disruption.
There are two reasons why the Court might treat workplace
grievances as per se unprotected: managerial prerogatives and bur-
dens of litigation. Both rationales, however, are quite problematic.
1. The Public Concern Test and Managerial Prerogatives.
The Connick court held workplace grievances was unprotected
speech because it found a sufficiently powerful governmental interest
in "enjoy[ing] wide latitude in managing their offices, without intru-
sive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment."92
The Court reiterated this point in Rankin: "public employers are em-
discriminate between speakers on the basis of their employment, or the content
of their speech.
Id. (footnote omitted). See generally Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of
Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 29-30 (1987).
89. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1945); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 103 (1940). See also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 230 (1977).
90. 461 U.S. at 147.
91. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
755-60 (1996); Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
92. 461 U.S. at 146.
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ployers, concerned with the efficient function of their operations; re-
view of every personnel decision made by a public employer could, in
the long run, hamper the performance of public functions."'9 3 In con-
trast to the Pickering balancing test, Connick's public concern test did
not discriminate between protected and unprotected speech based on
the speech's potential to interfere with a public employer's manage-
ment of government workplaces. If an employee's speech did not im-
plicate a matter of public concern, the Court left it unprotected even if
it had no potential to disrupt the workplace or impinge upon manage-
rial prerogatives.
Consider, for example, an employee who respectfully and dis-
creetly asks her supervisor to permit her to move her desk farther
away from a noisy copying machine. The supervisor refuses, and the
employee acquiesces. Under Connick, her supervisor is apparently
free to fire her for having made this request, even though it never
threatened managerial prerogatives or office efficiency, merely be-
cause this is "an employee grievance concerning internal office pol-
icy."94 Consider, also, Smith v. Fruin,95 a case that I argued and won
on behalf of the defendants, but surely would have lost under Con-
nick. John Smith, a Chicago police officer, alleged that he had re-
ceived a punitive assignment for complaining to his superiors that
other police officers were violating an ordinance prohibiting smoking
in public buildings outside of designated areas at the police station to
which he had been assigned.96 With no evidence that Officer Smith
had been disruptive or violated any department policy, the court nev-
ertheless held his complaints to be unprotected because he expressed
them in terms of his personal discomfort. 97
There is surely no reason to believe that the public concern test
best identifies the type of speech likely to infringe managerial prerog-
atives or disrupt the workplace. It is the Pickering balancing test that
screens out disruptive speech from constitutional protection. Con-
nick, unlike Pickering, authorizes content discrimination based not on
disruption, but on a lack of "public concern" with an employee's
93. 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987). See also Waters, 511 U.S. at 675 (explaining that "[t]he
government's interest in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is ele-
vated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one
when it acts as employer").
94. 461 U.S. at 154.
95. 28 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1083 (1995).
96. See id. at 645-47.
97. See id. at 651-52.
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grievances. Thus, the rule and its stated rationale simply do not line
up.
2. The Public Concern Test and the Burdens of Litigation.
Another plausible rationale suggested by the Court's opinion in
Connick is that the test is a means to screen out swearing contests
between supervisors and supervisees, which burden public employers
to defend and courts to decide. The fact that recognition of First
Amendment rights will require public entities to expend resources de-
fending themselves, and judges to expend resources deciding those
cases, however, has rarely been thought dispositive. Recently, for ex-
ample, the Court rather indignantly rejected the suggestion that it
should not afford public contractors a First Amendment right not to
be discharged because of their political beliefs and affiliations just be-
cause it would burden public bodies to defend the ensuing litigation.98
Moreover, there is little reason to believe that those allegations that
satisfy the public concern test are any less burdensome and intrusive
to defend than those that do not.
Perhaps, however, the Connick court did not use the public con-
cern test as a means to identify particularly intrusive claims. Maybe
the Court recognized that all litigation over employee discipline is
burdensome and intrusive; therefore, such cases must implicate a core
First Amendment value before they are heard. If that is what the
Court meant, it had a point. Most people, even those who advocate
expansive employer liability when some offsetting value justifies it, are
likely to agree that there is something uniquely intrusive about having
to explain personnel decisions to the satisfaction of a court. Thus, the
Court was onto something in Connick if it believed that the burdens
of litigating infringes managerial autonomy to such an extent that it
justifies limiting the speech rights of public employees whose speech is
not at the core of the First Amendment. 99 Obviously, when an em-
ployee's statements urge the public to hold government accountable
98. See O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 724 (1996); Board
of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 681 (1996).
99. Connick's language suggests that something similar concerned the Court: "When
employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, so-
cial, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in
managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First
Amendment." 461 U.S. at 146. Speech on public affairs, rather than issues of primarily
personal or private interest, is generally considered to be at the heart of the First Amend-
ment. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (plurality opinion); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
for its alleged misdeeds, the chance that an employer has illicit mo-
tives for imposing discipline may well be greatest since that type of
speech is likely to be particularly politically sensitive. Even so, the
public concern test is not a good means to filter out that kind of case
from those that most clearly threaten public employers legitimate pre-
rogatives because it is such a difficult test to administer.
C. The Adinistrability of the Public Concern Test
A court deciding whether speech addresses a matter of public
concern, can employ one of two methodologies. The first is an empiri-
cal test based on whether the public at large actually cares about the
subject matter raised. This approach is appealing if only because
when a speaker succeeds in capturing public attention, few could ar-
gue that the speaker has not raised a matter of public concern. This
approach is problematic, however, because it hinges First Amendment
protection on the employee's abilities as a publicist, and the public's
reaction to the particular matter that she raises. Normally, First
Amendment protection does not turn on whether the speaker is able
to convert people to her position,100 but that is the consequence of an
empirical approach.' 0 ' Even worse, public employees risk losing their
jobs when raising new issues with which the public is not yet familiar.
Therefore, any acceptable approach to a public concern test must
100. To the contrary, the Court is fond of writing that the First Amendment protects
unpopular ideas and viewpoints. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642 (1994);
Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 133-35.
101. Indeed, once in a while, courts face such problems directly and consider whether
speech can satisfy the public concern test even if there is no likelihood that the public
actually will care about the issue raised. In Fox v. District of Columbia, 83 F.3d 1491 (D.C.
Cir. 1996), for example, the district court denied protection to an employee's report that
$500 in public funds was missing from an unlocked safe, concluding that there was no
evidence that the public would be interested in a petty theft. The court of appeals re-
versed, reasoning that First Amendment protection is not reserved to cases inspiring front-
page coverage. Fox's report may not have been exciting-indeed, he did not name names
or make the sort of sweeping allegations that might tend to raise the public's eyebrows if
known-but it did involve the theft of funds from a public agency, evidently made possible
by a striking neglect, a matter that, unless the public is hopelessly jaded, would bear on its
appraisal of the agency's performance. See id. at 1494. See also Brown v. Disciplinary
Comm., 97 F.3d 969, 973-74 (7th Cir. 1996) (reversing the district court's determination
that volunteer firefighter's complaint about changing name of "Edgerton Fire Depart-
ment" to "Edgerton Fire Protection District" did not involve a matter of public concern
because of limited public interest in the issue, reasoning that "[t]he First Amendment
would be severely compromised if we required ideas to pass a popularity threshold before
they won protection.").
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leave room where speakers can raise issues of unproven public inter-
est and concern without risking retaliation from their employers. 112
Second, a court can take the normative approach. Courts could
develop a theory about what the public should care about and what
the public should merely regard as "employee complaints over inter-
nal office affairs."'0 3 That approach does not seem consistent with the
First Amendment. It allows judges, rather than the public, to decide
which issues merit public concern. We generally take as sacrosanct
that "governments must not be allowed to choose 'which issues are
worth discussing or debating.""' Thus, a normative approach to the
public concern test looks like the type of censorial power that the First
Amendment is ordinarily thought to deny to government institutions,
including the courts. Under a normative test courts assume the power
to decide which ideas enter the public debate, and which a public em-
ployer can legitimately seek to prevent from being disseminated
outside the workplace.
Nor is any workable normative theory immediately apparent.
Practically any employee grievance can be fairly characterized as rele-
vant to the public's assessment of what kind of job a public body is
doing on its behalf. There is no readily identifiable category of work-
place grievances that is plainly irrelevant to the public's ability to in-
form itself about public institutions and hence hold them accountable
for their performance. A supervisor's failure to improve workplace
efficiency by moving employees away from noisy copiers, for example,
could easily be of public concern. Of course the productivity (or lack
thereof) of public offices is often a staple of public debate about the
performance of government. Similarly, a police department's failure
to enforce a prohibition on smoking indoors, as in Smith v. Fruin,
could reflect on that department's efficiency, as well as its commit-
ment to enforce a law of considerable public concern.
Also, there is a question about the judiciary's competence to
make judgments about what type of information the public will find
102. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights:
The First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1, 58 (1990); Robert C.
Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic
Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 -ARv. L. Rev. 603, 673 (1990); R.
George Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REv. 27,
34-37 (1987).
103. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149.
104. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1980)
(quoting Police Dep't v. Moesly, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)).
helpful in its evaluation of public institutions. 05 Unlike elected offi-
cials, federal judges ordinarily are not expected to have a finger on the
public pulse. There is no reason to believe that unelected and life-
tenured judges have any particular ability to understand the public's
concerns or what information the public needs in order to hold offi-
cials accountable. What may first seem like office gossip may ulti-
mately serve to inform the public about the public institutions'
management. 6 What we call sexual harassment today probably
many people once considered mere office gossip; certainly many did
in the milieu that ordinarily produces judges. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
there are a distressing number of cases holding that allegations of sex-
ual harassment, or other forms of sex discrimination, do not involve
matters of public concern and hence finding that the plaintiff's com-
plaint receives no First Amendment protection.10 7 Anyone, however,
who bothers to ask the public whether it is concerned with managers
who use their government positions to harass or discriminate is likely
to get an affirmative response. Thus, there is little reason to believe
that judges can act as gatekeepers of the marketplace of ideas.
105. Indeed the Court once believed that this very point counseled against the use of a
public concern test to determine First Amendment protection. In Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court refused to adopt a test asking whether alleged defama-
tory speech involved a question of "general or public interest" before granting it First
Amendment protection against liability absent proof of malice since the Court doubted
"the wisdom of committing.., to the conscience of judges" the question "'what informa-
tion is relevant to self-government."' Id. at 346 (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). Then, in Connick, and again in Dun &
Bradstreet (although the main opinion in that case was authored by Justice Powell, who
wrote the opinion of the Court in Gertz), the Court, without explanation, embraced the
public concern test it had earlier scorned. Consistency, however, is reputedly the hobgob-
lin of small minds.
106. See generally, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The
Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 1, 30-32 (1990);
Robert C. Post, supra note 102, at 672.
107. See, e.g., David v. City of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1354-57 (10th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 157 (1997); Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475, 482-83 (10th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1357 (1995); Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 754-55 (11th Cir. 1993) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2708 (1994); Hartman v. Board of Trustees, 4 F.3d 465, 471-
72 (7th Cir. 1993); Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1189 (1994); Stewart v. Parish of Jefferson, 951 F.2d 681 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 820 (1992); Rice v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., 887 F.2d 716, 719-21
(6th Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 479 U.S. 1001 (1990); Callaway v. Hafeman, 832
F.2d 414,417 (7th Cir. 1987); Yatvin v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 840 F.2d 412,419-20 (7th
Cir. 1988). See also Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1530 (11th Cir. 1997)
(holding that singular allegation of disability discrimination did not raise a matter of public
concern); Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1352-54 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that em-
ployee complaint of racially hostile working environment did not raise a matter of public
concern).
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Finally, fealty to any normative approach to questions of public
concern becomes difficult when confronted with evidence that the
public actually cares about an issue.10 8 In fact, the tide is turning in
the sexual harassment and discrimination cases because courts are re-
sponding to heightened public concern to these issues.10 9 If no public
concern test can succeed, however, without permitting the parties to
adduce evidence about whether the public actually cares about an is-
sue, we are back to the empirical test with which we started. In other
words, First Amendment protection would turn on whether the
speaker can convince others to be concerned with an issue.
Only twice, in Connick and Rankin, has the Supreme Court dis-
cussed how to approach questions of public concern in the workplace.
These two cases, however, point in different directions. Rankin seems
to take a normative approach. Surely the Court did not mean to sug-
gest that the public was debating whether the President should be as-
sassinated, or, more generally, cared about what Ardith McPherson
thought of President Reagan. 10 To the contrary, the Court seems to
108. An example is provided by Lewis v. Harrison School District No. 1, 805 F.2d 310
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 905 (1987), a case that would seem to flunk the public
concern test except for the public's actual interest in the dispute. The court held in Lewis
that a school principal's presentation to the school board on behalf of his wife, a teacher in
the system who was to be transferred to another school, raised a matter of public concern,
relying primarily on the fact that there was a large turnout at the board meeting and news-
paper coverage of his remarks. Id. at 314-15. The opposite approach is illustrated by Rahn
v. Drake Center, Inc., 31 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1142 (1995). The
court in Rahn denied protection to a press release and television interview by a nurse as
chair of a committee opposing a plan to privatize much of the service provided by a public
hospital. Id. at 414. The court reasoned that even though the plaintiff had claimed that the
plan would lead to an unwise use of public funds, this much could be said of virtually
anything at a public workplace with which an employee disagreed. See id. at 412-13. That
may be true, but it put the court in the position of claiming that speech actually deemed
newsworthy, and relating to the manner in which public institutions discharge their func-
tions, was not of public concern. Nevertheless, the court was surely correct to observe that
if all allegations relating to the manner in which public funds are spent are deemed of
public concern, then virtually any workplace grievance will satisfy that test.
109. See, e.g., Azzaro v. County of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968, 978-80 (3d Cir. 1997); Voigt
v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1209 (1996); Davis v.
Ector County, 40 F.3d 777,781-83 (5th Cir. 1994); Wilson v. UT Health Ctr., 973 F.2d 1263,
1269-70 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1004 (1993); Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240,
1246-47 (10th Cir. 1992); Matulin v. Village of Lodi, 862 F.2d 609, 612-13 (6th Cir. 1988);
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1200-02 (3d Cir. 1988); Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d
1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987). See also Tao v. Freeh, 27
F.3d 635, 639-40 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that alleged pattern of discrimination raises
matter of public concern); Auriemma v. Rice, 910 F.2d 1449, 1459-61 (7th Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (holding that alleged racial bias in promotions raises a matter of public concern),
cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1204 (1991).
110. At best, the public might have been interested in the fact that a public employee
has seemingly advocated the assassination of the President, but Justice Scalia was undoubt-
have held that Ardith McPherson was entitled to express her own
view of the President in her own way, regardless of the reaction of
others. In Connick, however, the Court seems to have taken an em-
pirical approach. The dissenters, rather sensibly, argued that the pub-
lic should be concerned with the state of morale and discipline at a
prosecutor's office."' The majority did not disagree, but concluded
that the public would not have found Myers' questionnaire useful to
its evaluation of the district attorney's office. They noted that "the
questionnaire, if released to the public, would convey no information
at all other than the fact that a single employee is upset with the status
quo.""' The Court also took an empirical approach when it consid-
ered the one question (whether employees felt pressure to work in
political campaigns) that touched on a matter of public concern. It
observed that "there is a demonstrated interest in this country that
government service should depend upon meritorious performance
rather than political service." ''"3
Lacking clear guidance from the Supreme Court, the circuits have
struggled to develop a coherent approach as to what constitutes a mat-
ter of public concern. 14 In some areas the law is just in disarray (for
example when public employees allege discrimination or harassment
in the workplace). More often the circuits avoid square conflicts by
making their decisions intensely fact-driven, thus employing what has
become a highly evolved form of content discrimination. Courts parse
edly correct to argue that the fact that the public might be outraged by a statement does
not for that reason make the statement constitutionally protected on the ground that it
addresses a matter of public concern. See Rankin 483 U.S. 378, 396-98 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
111. See Connick 461 U.S. at 163 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 148.
113. Id. at 149.
114. In fact, there is something of a consensus among the commentators that the diffi-
culties in developing any principled approach to the public concern test render it essen-
tially standardless. See, e.g., Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to
Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43 (1988); Cynthia L. Estlund,
supra note 106, at 43-51; Arlen W. Langvardt, Public Concern Revisited: A New Role For
An Old Constitutional Doctrine in the Constitutional Law of Defamation, 21 VAL. U.L.
REv. 241, 259-70 (1987); Toni M. Massaro, supra note 88, at 27-33; Robert C. Post, supra
note 102, at 667-74; Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A
New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEo. L.J. 1519, 1540-45
(1987); Peter C. McCabe III, Note, Connick v. Myers: New Restrictions on the Free Speech
Rights of Government Employees, 60 IND. LJ. 339, 358-59 (1985); D. Gordon Smith, Com-
ment, Beyond "Public Concern": New Free Speech Standards for Public Employees, 57 U.
Cm. L. REv. 249, 258-62 (1990); Nadine Renee Dahm, Note, Protecting Public Employees
and Defamation Defendants: A Two-Tiered Analysis at What Constitutes "A Matter of Pub-
lic Concern," 23 VAL. U.L. REv. 587, 594-605 (1988-89).
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employees' statements as finely as tax lawyers parse revenue rulings,
and then decide whether the employee's speech focused more on her
own working conditions as opposed to some broader issue. In cases
where the employee alleges that her employer is not adequately serv-
ing the public, for example, her statements are frequently held to raise
matters of public concern because she alleges that the public body is
not properly discharging its responsibilities. 115 A different result is
reached though when the public employee focuses too much on her
working conditions." 6 In contrast, if the employee makes allegations
of corruption or misconduct she also seems to satisfy the public con-
115. See, e.g., Campbell v. Towse, 99 F.3d 820, 827-28 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that of-
ficer's criticism of community-oriented policing program raised a matter of public con-
cern), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1254 (1997); Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1343-45
(8th Cir. 1993) (holding that claim that fire department lacks sufficient resources raised a
matter of public concern), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1072 (1994); Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d
491, 495-96 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (holding that charge of waste and inefficiency at
hospital raised a matter of public concern); Johnsen v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 3, 891
F.2d 1485, 1490 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that criticism of hospital's medication policy
raised a matter of public concern); Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364, 370-71 (5th Cir.
1989) (holding that firefighters' claim that department lacked adequate staffing raised a
matter of public concern), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1003 (1989); Frazier v. King, 873 F.2d 820,
825-26 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that criticisms of quality of nursing care raised a matter of
public concern), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 977 (1989); Hamer v. Brown, 831 F.2d 1398, 1402-03
(8th Cir. 1987) (holding that criticisms of firefighter training raised a matter of public con-
cern); Ohse v. Hughes, 816 F.2d 1144, 1150-53 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that attack on com-
petence of probation supervisors raised a matter of public concern), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1025 (1988); Rookard v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 710 F.2d 41, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding
that charge of waste and inefficiency at hospital raised a matter of public concern).
116. See, e.g., Roe v. City of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 585-86 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that police officer's memorandum disagreeing with prosecutor's decision not to file charges
in case handled by officer because of prosecutor's view on legality of search did not raise a
matter of public concern); Pearson v. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth., 952 F.2d 1274,
1278-79 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that nurse's criticisms of cleaning of operating room did
not raise a matter of public concern); Smith v. Cleburne County Hosp., 870 F.2d 1375 (8th
Cir. 1989) (holding that doctor's attacks on quality of patient care did not raise a matter of
public concern), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 847 (1989); Brown v. City of Trenton, 867 F.2d 318,
321-22 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that police officers' complaints about chief's lack of support
for emergency response team did not raise a matter of public concern); Mings v. Depart-
ment of Justice, 813 F.2d 384,387-88 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that INS employee's letter to
superior criticizing INS forms did not raise a matter of public concern); Gomez v. Texas
Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 794 F.2d 1018, 1023 (5th Cir. 1986) (hold-
ing that employee complaints about patients' length of stay at mental health facility did not
raise a matter of public concern); Zaky v. United States Veterans Admin., 793 F.2d 832,
839 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that cardiologist's criticism of hospital's policies and personnel
did not raise a matter of public concern), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937 (1986); Linhart v.
Glatfelter, 771 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that police chief's opinion that
village manager was incompetent did not raise a matter of public concern); Davis v. West
Community Hosp., 755 F.2d 455, 460-61 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that doctor's complaints
about competence of other staff did not raise a matter of public concern).
cern test,117 but not when her statements are about her own job.11
An employee can satisfy the public concern test when she criticizes
her employer's personnel policies if she makes it sound like the poli-
cies interfere with her employer's ability to serve the public,119 but not
117. See, e.g., Hulbert v. Wilhelm, 120 F.3d 648, 653-54 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that
allegations of improper billing and department's responsibility for a fire raised a matter of
public concern); Fox v. District of Columbia, 83 F.3d 1491, 1494 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding
that theft of cash from unlocked safe raised a matter of public concern); Fikes v. City of
Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1084 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that officer's report of misconduct by
colleague raised a matter of public concern); Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, 64 F.3d 389,
396 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that waste and incompetence alleged in construction project
raised a matter of public concern), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1166 (1996); Feldman v. Philadel-
phia Hous. Auth., 43 F.3d 823, 829 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that auditor's reports critical of
authority's management raised a matter of public concern); Marshall v. Porter County Plan
Comm'n, 32 F.3d 1215, 1219-20 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that allegations of inspector's false
billings and nonfeasance raised a matter of public concern), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1155
(1995); Casey v. City of Cabool, 12 F.3d 799, 802-03 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that officials'
misuse of city resources raised a matter of public concern), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 932
(1994); Glass v. Dachel, 2 F.3d 733, 740-42 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that deputy sheriff's
comment that superior may have stolen property raised a matter of public concern); Pat-
rick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that alleged improper
budgeting practices raised a matter of public concern); Biggs v. Village of Dupo, 892 F.2d
1298, 1301-02 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that police officer's charge of political interference
with police department raised a matter of public concern); Gillette v. Delmore, 886 F.2d
1194, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that firefighter allegation that person in need of
medical care was mistreated raised a matter of public concern); Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883
F.2d 842, 856-60 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that police officer's allegations of misconduct by
superiors raised a matter of public concern); Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 816-17 (10th
Cir. 1989) (holding that allegation of supervisor's drinking raised a matter of public con-
cern); O'Donnell v. Yanchulis, 875 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that political
favoritism alleged in police department raised a matter of public concern); Brawner v. City
of Richardson, 855 F.2d 187, 191-92 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that police officer alleged
favoritism during investigation of another officer raised a matter of public concern); Cona-
way v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 795-96 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that alleged misconduct of
colleagues reported to superior raised a matter of public concern); Solomon v. Royal Oak
Township, 842 F.2d 862, 865 (6th Cir. 1988) (police officer alleged that superior impeded
investigation raised a matter of public concern); Marohnic v. Walker, 800 F.2d 613, 616 (6th
Cir. 1986) (holding that complaints about false billing raised a matter of public concern);
Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 106-07 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that speech attacking
county garage as wasteful raised a matter of public concern).
118. See, e.g., Smith v. Fruin, 28 F.3d at 651-53 (holding that officer's allegation that
indoor smoking ordinance was not enforced by his superiors did not raise a matter of
public concern); Thomson v. Scheid, 977 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that
fraud investigator's allegations of misconduct did not raise a matter of public concern),
cert. denied, 508 U.S. 910 (1993); McMurphy v. City of Flushing, 802 F.2d 191, 197-98 (6th
Cir. 1986) (holding that police officer's allegations of superior's misconduct did not raise a
matter of public concern).
119. See, e.g., Watters v. City of Philadelphia, 55 F.3d 886, 892-95 (3d Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that program manager's criticisms of police department's employee assistance program
raised a matter of public concern); Piesco v. City of New York, 933 F.2d 1149, 1157 (2d
Cir.) (holding that testimony that police exams were worthless raised a matter of public
concern), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 921 (1991); Hamer v. Brown, 831 F.2d 1398, 1402 (8th Cir.
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when appearing to ensure her self-interest. 120  In the case of a
teacher's statements about the quality of education, for example, criti-
cisms of public schools are generally considered of public concern,' 2'
unless the teacher sounds too concerned with her own classroom. 22
1987) (holding that claim to investigating committee that employer was underfunding pro-
grams and indiscriminately firing employees raised a matter of public concern); Brockell v.
Norton, 732 F.2d 664, 667 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that claim that police supervisors had
improperly obtained copy of certification test raised a matter of public concern).
120. See, e.g., Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1530 (11th Cir. 1997)
(employee's complaint about employer's failure to accommodate his disability); Colburn v.
Trustees, 973 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1992) (criticisms of peer evaluation in sociology depart-
ment); Sanguigni v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., 968 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1992) (teacher's
statements about low morale); Ezekwo v. NYC Health & Hosp. Corp., 940 F.2d 775 (2d
Cir.) (doctor's criticisms of hospital's residency program), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1013
(1991); Mussey v. Gardner, 741 F.2d 434, 438-39 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (FBI agent's criticism of
furlough policy), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 (1985).
121. See, e.g., Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 324-25 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that
teacher's statements regarding principal's alleged misrepresentations of student achieve-
ment test scores satisfy public concern test); Hall v. Marion Sch. Dist. No. 2, 31 F.3d 183,
192-93 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that teacher's claim that school mismanaged budget satis-
fies public concern test); Schiller v. Moore, 30 F.3d 1281, 1284 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding
that principal's criticism of school reorganization plan might pass public concern test);
Tompkins v. Vickers, 26 F.3d 603, 606-07 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that teacher's complaints
about canceling an art program satisfy public concern test); Powell v. Gallentine, 992 F.2d
1088, 1090-91 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that professor's claim that school mismanaged
budget satisfies public concern test); Stroman v. Colleton County Sch. Dist., 981 F.2d 152,
156-58 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that teacher's complaint of school's mismanaged budget
satisfies public concern test); Maples v. Martin, 858 F.2d 1546, 1552-53 (11th Cir. 1988)
(holding that criticisms of curriculum in mechanical engineering department satisfy public
concern test); Piver v. Pender County Bd. of Educ., 835 F.2d 1076, 1080-82 (4th Cir. 1987)
(holding that teacher's support for principal satisfies public concern test), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1206 (1988); Honore v. Douglas, 833 F.2d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that pro-
fessor's criticism of the dean satisfies public concern test); Southside Pub. Sch. v. Hill, 827
F.2d 270, 274 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that criticism of special education satisfies public
concern test); Cox v. Dardenelle Pub. Sch. Dist., 790 F.2d 668, 672 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding
that teacher's criticism of principal's policies satisfies public concern test); Johnson v. Lin-
coin Univ., 776 F.2d 443, 450 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that criticism of quality of chemistry
department satisfies public concern test); Bowman v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist.,
723 F.2d 640, 644 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that assistant coach's criticism of head coach's
use of corporal punishment satisfies public concern test).
122. See, e.g., Khuans v. Sch. Dist. 110, 123 F.3d 1010, 1016-17 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding
that school psychologist's complaints about supervisor's performance constitute private
concerns); Wales v. Board of Educ. of Sch. Dist. 300, 120 F.3d 82, 85 (7th Cir. 1997) (ex-
plaining that teacher's complaints about lack of discipline constitute private concerns); Wil-
liams v. Alabama State Univ., 102 F.3d 1179, 1183 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that
teacher's complaints, privately made to supervisor, were private concerns); Gardetto v.
Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 812-15 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that teacher's criticism of internal
administration and personal grievances did not directly affect public's perception of quality
of education); Cliff v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 409-11 (7th Cir. 1994) (explain-
ing that teacher's complaints of large class size and its affects on her ability to control the
students did not rise to level of public concern); Daniels v. Quinn, 801 F.2d 687, 690 (4th
Cir. 1986) (finding that a teacher's complaint regarding late arrival of remedial reading
Courts make a similarly elaborate inquiry when an employee is disci-
plined for helping a colleague assert legal rights,1' 3 or even when an
employee is disciplined for appearing in blackface, as has happened at
least twice and which led to different (and barely reconcilable) out-
comes.' 24 Although some readers might harmonize these holdings,
the public concern test has raised arbitrary content and viewpoint dis-
crimination to new and unparalleled heights.
D. The Manipulabiity of the Public Concern Test
All this illustrates both why we can have limited confidence in the
ability of courts to identify which employee grievances merit constitu-
tional protection, and how easily an employee can manipulate the
public concern test. Sheila Myers lost her case only because the bulk
of her questionnaire "did not seek to inform the public that the Dis-
trict Attorney's Office was not discharging its governmental responsi-
bilities" or "seek to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or
breach of public trust."'" If she had affirmatively expressed the view,
however, that the office's transfer policies were depriving it of exper-
ienced prosecutors in key positions, and thus detracting from its effec-
materials did not imply discrimination, corruption, nor waste, and therefore did not consti-
tute public concern); Saye v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J, 785 F.2d 862, 866 (10th Cir.
1986) (holding that the presumption falls in favor of the employer when employee speech
concerning office policy arises from employment dispute concerning the very application of
that policy to the employee); Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1986) (explaining
that teacher's complaints about the teacher assignment policy's effect on his position and
student collegiate registration's effect on his ability to control his students did not consti-
tute matters of public concern).
123. Compare Barnes v. Small, 840 F.2d 972, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that
speech of an employee representing other union members was unprotected where it did
not relate to general matters of public concern), with Marshall v. Allen, 984 F.2d 787 (7th
Cir. 1993) (protecting the speech of an employee who assisted others in prosecution of a
discrimination complaint), and Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d
1565, 1576-78 (5th Cir. 1989) (declaring employee's testimony at discrimination hearing
protected), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990). See also Green v. Philadelphia Housing
Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 886-87 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that employee's appearance at col-
league's bail hearing was protected); Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1288 (3d Cir. 1996)
(holding that an employee testifying pursuant to subpoena at supervisor's divorce proceed-
ing satisfies the public concern test); Knowlton v. Greenwood Indep. Sch. Dist., 957 F.2d
1172, 1177-78 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a group of employees asserting their rights
under Fair Labor Standards Act were not protected by the First Amendment).
124. Compare Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998-99 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding off-duty
performance in blackface protected), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986), with Tindle v.
Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 69 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding officer's appearance at party in blackface
unprotected).
125. 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983).
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tiveness, she would have satisfied the test.'26 She would have,
however, just as clearly been infringing on managerial prerogatives.
An employee blessed with a modicum of imagination, or legal
advice, can state virtually any criticism of a public employer in terms
that will satisfy the public concern test. Consider once again the case
of Officer Smith. If he had received legal advice before he com-
plained about second-hand smoke at his workplace, he would have
framed his complaint differently. Doubtless he would have said that
the Chicago Police Department's failure to enforce Chicago's Clean
Indoor Air Ordinance at his workplace reflected the department's dis-
turbing failure to seriously consider its responsibility to enforce the
law and to treat the Chicago City Council's duly enacted directives
with the requisite seriousness. Furthermore, he would have added,
second-hand smoke endangers the health of everyone who visits the
police station where he worked. Indeed virtually any time an em-
ployee frames her grievance in terms of a public employer's waste,
inefficiency, or wrongdoing, she has a pretty good chance of satisfying
the public concern test. 27
Thus, the public concern test, at least as it operates in practice, is
little more than an trap for the unwary; hence, those who do not know
the ritual incantation necessary before they speak (or at least before
they are deposed) lose. A test does little to protect legitimate mana-
gerial prerogatives if it depends so heavily on the fortuity of how an
employee frames his grievance, and on the paucity of legal advice
available to many public employees. Indeed, this is a triumph of form
over substance.
The end of the road for the public concern test as a means to
weed out mere workplace disputes may well be foreshadowed by Wa-
ters v. Churchill. Waters seems like a classic garden variety case about
a disagreement between an employee and her supervisor on work-
place management, yet no Justice said that Cheryl Churchill's com-
plaints about the obstetrics department failed to raise a matter of
126. In fact, in Zambori v. Stamler, 847 F.2d 73 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 899
(1988), the plaintiff did just that. The court held that an employee's criticism of the person-
nel policies of the prosecutor's office were framed in such a way as to raise a matter of
public concern. See id. at 77-78.
127. See cases cited supra notes 105, 107, 109 and 111. An especially compelling exam-
ple of just this problem is provided by Withiam v. Baptist Health Care Hosp. of Oklahoma,
Inc, 98 F.3d 581 (10th Cir. 1996). The court held that Withiam's public endorsement of the
incumbent management of the hospital that employed her did not raise a matter of public
concern, even though made in the form of a formal resolution submitted to the board of
trustees, because the resolution did not contain sufficient reasoning to inform the public
about the issue in any meaningful way. See id at 583.
public concern. If Churchill satisfied the public concern test, how
many other workplace grievances cannot be formulated in similar
terms in order to satisfy that test?
E. The Problem of Overbreadth
One other aspect of the public concern test merits concern: it
does not require an employer to have any policy or standards for the
types of comments for which it disciplines employees. In Connick and
Waters, the Court upheld dismissals even though the employee had
violated no office policy or established practice. In both cases the
Court validated the right of management to make ad hoc and standar-
dless terminations based on the public employee's speech.
In all other areas of First Amendment jurisprudence, when the
government imposes ad hoc and standardless regulation of speech, the
Court quickly invalidates such restrictions as unconstitutional, even if
the plaintiff's own conduct is not constitutionally protected. Standar-
dless regulation of speech creates an impermissible risk that the gov-
ernment will use its discretion as a pretext to engage in otherwise
forbidden content or viewpoint discrimination.1 8 This rationale
surely applies to employee discipline; which is more likely to be used
against the partisan opponents of incumbent management than its
supporters. Ad hoc discipline, even though permitted by Connick, is
justified only if one can tolerate a serious risk of content and view-
point discrimination brought about by the absence of heightened judi-
cial review.
Even if one disregards the risk of viewpoint discrimination, there
is another objection to standardless regulation of a public employee's
speech. When proscriptions on speech are at issue the First Amend-
ment generally requires more precision and predictability to avoid
problems of overbreadth than an ad hoc approach can provide. Thus,
standardless regulation is ordinarily vulnerable to attack, even if
plaintiff's own speech is unprotected.
The overbreadth doctrine permits a plaintiff to attack the facial
validity of a regulation if the regulation proscribes a substantial quan-
tum of protected speech, even if the plaintiffs own speech is unpro-
tected.' 29 Courts invalidate overbroad enactments on their face
128. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130-33 (1992);
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-26 (1990) (plurality opinion); City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 762-68 (1986).
129. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988); Board of Airport Comm'rs v.
Jews For Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458-59
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because such restrictions have an unacceptable "chilling effect" on
protected speech.13° Hence, Sheila Myers, Cheryl Churchill and other
employees whose speech is unprotected under Connick should have
been able to mount an overbreadth attack on the facial validity of the
restriction at issue in their cases.
When a public employer fires an employee for based on her
speech, in the absence of an articulated and facially valid policy, the
problem of overbreadth is quite real. Even an employee who wishes
to speak out on matters of public concern in a non-disruptive manner
will pause if she is not sure whether it will cost her her job. 3' Regard-
less of what one may think as an empirical matter of the likelihood
that overly broad statutes or regulations chill protected speech, 32 the
"chilling effect" problem is surely quite real in the workplace. Any-
one who doubts the existence of a "chilling effect" should visit an of-
fice after a known dissident has been fired. Once the message gets out
that those who speak up in defiance of the boss will get sacked, the
result is predictable. After all, few of us like to gamble with our jobs.
Without clear directives on what type of speech is impermissible, an
employee who speaks out risks termination and faces unemployment
and years of litigation even if she is confident that a court will rule in
her favor. Even an employee who files a declaratory judgment action
to test his right to speak out must worry about retaliation.
In Connick and Waters, public employers made ad hoc decisions
to fire employees based on no announced or articulated policy, other
than that the employer thought that it had "cause" to discharge be-
cause it felt the employee's statements likely would adversely effect
the workplace. Such a policy would be broad enough to sweep up
plenty of protected speech, including the statements at issue in Picker-
ing, Perry, Mt. Healthy and Rankin. Under these cases, the First
(1987); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982); Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flip-
side, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1981).
130. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 & n.8 (1990); Massachusetts v. Oakes,
491 U.S. 576, 584 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 586 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part); Board of Airport Comm'rs, 482 U.S. at 574; Brockett v. Spo-
kane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers For
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,798-801 (1984); Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,216-17
(1975); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,612 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,
520-21 (1972).
131. See Edward J. Fuhr, The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions and the First
Amendment, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 97, 142-55 (1988-89).
132. See generally, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construc-
tion of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 205-09 (1985); Martin H. Redish, The Burger
Court and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1031, 1040-41
(1984).
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Amendment bars an employer from discharging an employee merely
because she criticizes management's performance. 133 The Connick
line of cases, however, grants broad discretion on the part of employ-
ers to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights. The question thus
arises whether Connick and Waters would have come out differently if
the plaintiffs had made overbreadth arguments?
A public employer faced with an overbreadth claim by an em-
ployee can make three arguments. First, the employer can argue that
the overbreadth doctrine is only applicable to enactments, statutes, or
regulations, but not to individual employment decisions. This argu-
ment elevates form over substance: if a statute or regulation can be
attacked as overbroad, why not a de facto policy with the same inhibi-
tory effect on protected speech? 134 In any event, a discharged public
employee can readily frame an overbreadth attack on her dismissal as
a challenge to an enactment. Public employers derive their power to
hire and fire from some type of statute, ordinance, or similar grant of
authority, and overbreadth challenges are permitted when an enact-
ment "delegates overly broad discretion to the decisionmaker. '1 35
Thus, if an enactment is required to mount an overbreadth challenge,
the employee need identify only the statute, ordinance, or regulation
that grants the employer broad discretion to discharge for "cause" or
otherwise.
Second, the public employer can argue against the application of
the overbreadth doctrine to its hiring and firing decisions because per-
mitting such attacks on its employment decisions would be too great
an infringement of its managerial prerogatives. There is nothing, how-
ever, in the case law that would support this argument. Public em-
ployees have been permitted to challenge enactments governing the
terms and conditions of their employment on grounds of overbreadth
133. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIE, supra note 74, § 12-29 at 1031; Cass R. Sunstein,
Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REv. 889, 918-20 (1986).
134. If anything, the absence of a generally applicable enactment ought to call for
stricter rather than relaxed judicial review. In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512
U.S. 753 (1995), the Court refused to afford a content-neutral injunction against protest
activities outside of abortion clinics the degree of deference that it affords statutes and
ordinances, since injunctions "carry greater risks of censorship or discriminatory applica-
tion than do general ordinances." Id. at 764. See also Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519
U.S. 357 (1997). That point would apply with even greater force to an individual decision
to terminate a public employee because she has said something with which her employer
disagrees.
135. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992). Accord, e.g.,
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-56 (1986); Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965).
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for decades. 36 The two seminal cases for contemporary overbreadth
doctrine are Broadrick v. Oklahoma'37 and United States Civil Service
Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers.138 Both cases
challenged restrictions on the political activities of public employees.
Furthermore, in both cases the Court allowed public employees to
mount overbreadth challenges to statutes regulating the terms and
conditions of public employment, although it rejected those challenges
on their merits. The Court has even acknowledged that public em-
ployment presents a clear example when overbroad regulation of
speech could have a "chilling effect" on those who wish to engage in
protected speech. The Court recognized this problem in Pickering,
when it wrote "the threat of dismissal from public employment is... a
potent means of inhibiting speech."' 39 Therefore, courts should apply
the overbreadth doctrine with full force and vigor to public employ-
ment. Policies and practices governing employee speech should be de-
fined clearly so that no impermissible "chill" would result.140 As the
Court recognized in Rankin: "[v]igilance is necessary to ensure that
public employers do not use authority over employees to silence dis-
course, not because it hampers public functions but simply because
superiors disagree with the content of employees' speech."' 4 ' One
would think that the required "vigilance" would include overbreadth
review.
Third, the employer can argue that its policy governing employee
discipline is not fatally overbroad. That argument should prevail for
those employers with clearly articulated policies that on their face
comport with the First Amendment. When an employee, however,
has not violated some preexisting and facially valid policy, as in Con-
136. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tacker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
137. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
138. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
139. 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968). Accord Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S.
668, 675 (1996).
140. The only context in which the Court has refused to apply overbreadth is commer-
cial speech. The Court reasons that the profit motive provides commercial speakers with a
sufficiently powerful incentive and that those whose own speech is protected are unlikely
to be deterred by the existence of overbroad regulations, but instead are likely to challenge
those regulations as applied to their own conduct. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 481-83 (1989); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 536 n.15 (1987); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350,380-81 (1977). That
reasoning, if anything, supports application of the overbreadth doctrine to the speech of
public employees, whose own financial interests will tend to deter them from engaging in
speech that courts discipline.
141. 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987).
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nick and Waters, the employer will not be able to mount this defense.
In such cases, the employer can not point to any policy that on its face
reaches at most an insubstantial quantum of protected speech. Yet no
one should assume too quickly that an overbreadth argument would
have carried the day for Sheila Myers or Cheryl Churchill. On ques-
tions of overbreadth, as in other areas where the speech of public em-
ployees is at stake, the rules seem different.
Consider Arnett v. Kennedy.142 The Chicago office of the Office
of Economic Opportunity fired Wayne Kennedy, a field representa-
tive, after its regional director concluded that Kennedy had recklessly
and falsely accused him of trying to bribe a community organiza-
tion. 43 In an action challenging the termination, Kennedy argued,
among other things, that the provision of the Lloyd-La Follette Act
which authorized dismissal of federal employees "for such cause as
will promote the efficiency of the service"'" was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad. 45
The plurality opinion (which seemed to represent the view of a
majority of the Court on this point)146 initially concluded that the
term "cause" was not fatally vague "[b]ecause of the infinite variety of
factual situations in which public statements by Government employ-
ees might reasonably justify dismissal."' 4 7 The plurality then decided
that the Act should be construed consistent with First Amendment
standards governing the rights of public employees, since Congress
"obviously did not intend to authorize discharge under the Act's re-
moval standard for speech that is constitutionally protected.' 1 48 Rely-
ing on Pickering, the plurality next concluded that the statute was not
invalid as applied to Kennedy, since defamatory statements, recklessly
made, are not constitutionally protected. 4 9 That left Kennedy's over-
breadth claim, which the plurality described as:
the assertion that although no constitutionally protected con-
duct of his own was the basis for his discharge.., the statutory
142. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
143. See id. at 137.
144. 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970).
145. 416 U.S. at 158 (plurality opinion).
146. Although the plurality opinion, written by then-Justice Rehnquist, was joined only
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, on the First Amendment issue three other
Justices, while not joining the opinion, indicated their agreement with it. See id. at 164
(Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); see i&. at 177 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
147. Id. at 161.
148. Id. at 162.
149. 416 U.S. 134, 162-63 (1974).
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language must be declared inoperative, and a set of more partic-
ularized regulations substituted for it, because the generality of
its language might result in marginal situations in which other
persons seeking to engage in constitutionally protected conduct
would be deterred from doing so.150
The plurality rejected that claim: "[b]ut we have already held that
Congress in establishing a standard of 'cause' for discharge did not
intend to include within that term any constitutionally protected
conduct." 151
Perhaps Arnett v. Kennedy is correctly decided if limited to an
employee knowingly making reckless falsehoods. Although the plu-
rality did not articulate how the statute could be construed to elimi-
nate overbreadth problems, it applied the rule to Kennedy's case that
recklessly false accusations against a superior are grounds for termina-
tion. Pickering blessed that rule. Overbreadth problems will not de-
velop because the reckless falsity requirement is unlikely to chill those
employees whose speech is protected. 152 But what if the "cause" for
an employee's termination has nothing to do with intentional or reck-
less misconduct, and instead is that a an employee has said something
that the supervisor thinks will do harm in the workplace? Such a rule
has ample potential to reach protected conduct.
Moreover, Arnett predates Connick's public concern test, which
adds a new potential for chilling effect on speech. After Connick, an
employee, who is deciding whether to speak out in a manner that is
likely to anger management, must assess whether her speech will sat-
isfy both the public concern and the Pickering balancing tests. These
questions are sufficiently difficult such that the Supreme Court has
divided 5-4 on them in the two cases that brought these issues before
it.'53 Had Sheila Myers or Ardith McPherson been able to hire a
Supreme Court Justice for advice on whether they could lose their job
for what they intended to write and say there is a nearly even chance
that each would have gotten the wrong answer. The Seventh Circuit,
for that matter, would have given Cheryl Churchill bad advice as
well.154 Problems of overbreadth ought to be taken seriously when
150. Id. at 163.
151. Id.
152. Indeed, that much was likely settled by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), where the Court held that defamation liability would not impermissibly chill
protected speech if predicated on intentional or reckless falsehood.
153. I refer of course to Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), and Rankin v. McPher-
son, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
154. See Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114 (7th Cir. 1992), vacated and remanded, 511
U.S. 661 (1994). A statute with a "core of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscrib-
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there is that much imprecision about whether public employees can
speak without fear of retaliation.
Outside its facts, Arnett's approach to overbreadth is impossible
to defend because it is utterly at odds with the purpose of the over-
breadth doctrine.15 Even if the Court properly imposed a limiting
construction on the Lloyd-La Follette Act (not fairly suggested by its
text) in order to save it, it merely read the statute as if it permitted
discharge "except in contravention of the First Amendment." The
First Amendment, however, implicitly limits all statutes; if that were
all that was necessary to save a statute, none would be invalidated for
overbreadth. As Professor Tribe has written:
[t]he premise underlying any instance of facial invalidation for
overbreadth must be that the Constitution does not, in and of
itself, provide a bright enough line to guide primary conduct,
and that a law whose reach into protected spheres limited only
by the background assurance that unconstitutional applications
will eventually be set aside is a law that will deter too much that
is in fact protected.'56
Aside from Arnett, that seems to be the Court's view as well. The
Court has consistently held that overbroad laws are facially invalid,
even if case-by-case adjudication could narrow their scope, since such
broad proscriptions will have a chilling effect while as-applied litiga-
tion is conducted. 57
able conduct" is unlikely to be overbroad, see e.g., Ohio v. Osborne, 495 U.S. 103, 111
(1990); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 468-69 (1987); Secretary of State v. Joseph H.
Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 965-66 (1984); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770 n.25
(1982), but that does not describe a statute authorizing termination for "cause" like the
Lloyd-La Follette Act, especially after the complications of Connick are added to the mix.
155. The only case the plurality cited in Arnett to support its approach was Colten v.
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), in which the Court rejected vagueness and overbreadth
attacks on a disorderly conduct statute. 416 U.S. at 163. In Colten, however, the statute
required disobedience of a police officer's order to disperse with intent to cause inconven-
ience, annoyance or alarm, thereby giving persons sufficient notice to avoid fatal vague-
ness, 407 U.S. at 110, and the statute had been construed to apply only where the order to
disperse is supported by "a particular public interest in preventing that expression or con-
duct at that time and place." I& at 111. The Lloyd-La Follette Act, in contrast, did not
require an employee to have any type of evil intent to be terminated, nor did it require
disobedience of a supervisor's directive. Thus the Act had potential application to employ-
ees who do not do anything they knew or should have known was prohibited.
156. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, supra note 74, § 12-29 at 1031 (emphasis deleted). See also
Richard H. Fallon, Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 903-07 (1991).
157. See, e.g., Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews For Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 575-76
(1987); City of Houston, 482 U.S. at 465-66; City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g. Co.,
486 U.S. 750, 758-59 (1986). There is at least one prominent dissenter from this view of the
overbreadth doctrine. That is Professor Monaghan, who has written that the doctrine is
not a distinct principle of First Amendment law, but merely embodies the principle that a
litigant has a right to have a constitutionally permissible rule applied to his own case, and
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In Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews For Jesus, Inc.,158 for
example, the Board of Commissioners adopted a resolution prohibit-
ing "First Amendment activities" at the Los Angeles International
Airport.15 9 The Court invalidated the regulation as overbroad despite
the Board's insistence that it would construe the resolution to reach
only that conduct that it could permissibly regulate. The Court rea-
soned that "it is difficult to imagine that the resolution could be lim-
ited by anything less than a series of adjudications, and the chilling
effect of the resolution on protected speech in the meantime would
make case-by-case adjudication intolerable."' 6 ° The same is true,
however, of the Lloyd-La Follette Act at issue in Arnett. Such a stat-
ute might be valid if supplemented by office policies or even admoni-
tions to employees about what types of speech are forbidden, but a
standard of "cause," without more, grants employers the very type of
discretion that the overbreadth doctrine is ordinarily thought to
forbid. 6'
hence does not limit the ability of courts to construe statutes narrowly in order to ensure
that the rule applied in each case is valid. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981
Sup. CT. REv. 1. Whatever that view's merit as an original matter, it is not the course the
doctrine has taken. First, the Court continues to insist that enactments not have an imper-
missible chilling effect even if they could be narrowed by construction. See, e.g., LAU-
RENCE H. TRIE, supra note 74, § 12-29; Richard H. Fallon, supra note 156, at 872-74.
Second, the Court continues to believe that the overbreadth doctrine is unique to the First
Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
158. 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
159. Id. at 570-71.
160. Id. at 575-76.
161. The facial validity of statutes should be considered in light of any authoritative
regulations, limiting constructions, or settled administrative practices. See, e.g., Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1989); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988).
Moreover, an employer should be able to supplement general policies with specific admo-
nitions to employees, and defend overbreadth attacks with a showing that she was warned
that an employee was violating office policy and failed to desist. That was the approach
taken in Colten v. Kentucky, the only case cited by the Arnett plurality in support of its
overbreadth holding. See supra note 155. Colten had been convicted of disorderly conduct
because he had persisted in arguing with a police officer that had issued a traffic ticket to
another person, and ignored the officer's order to him to leave. See Colten, 407 U.S. at
106-08. The Court rejected Colten's vagueness and overbreadth challenges to the disor-
derly conduct statute, relying in part on the fact that individuals who choose to argue with
the police while they are performing their duties have ample notice that they are subject to
arrest if they disobey an order to move one. See id. at 110-11. There is no reason why the
Arnett plurality could not properly apply this approach to public employment-the "chil-
ling effect" of overbroad enactments is mitigated if people cannot be penalized until they
are warned to desist from what would otherwise be unprotected conduct. But in Arnett,
unlike Colten, the statute at issue did not require issuance of a warning prior to the imposi-
tion of sanctions.
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The Court took a different approach to the facial validity of a
statute governing the public employees' speech in United States v. Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union ("NTEU").'62 In NTEU, the Court
struck down a statutory prohibition on federal employees' acceptance
of compensation for making speeches, appearances, or for their writ-
ings. The Court focused on the Pickering balancing test since parties
did not dispute that the plaintiffs intended to write on matters of pub-
lic concern. 63 The Court concluded that the honoraria ban had a sub-
stantial impact on employees, both because of its "widespread
impact" and because it "chills potential speech before it happens.' 64
On the government's side of the balance, the only evidence of abuse it
produced to support the ban involved members of Congress or high-
ranking executive officials. The Court did not think that evidence jus-
tified a prohibition reaching "an immense class of workers with negli-
gible power to confer favors on those who might pay to hear them
speak or to read their articles."' 65 Accordingly, the Court invalidated
the statute and refused as well to modify the lower court's judgment
so that it would not reach employees to whom the Solicitor General's
thought the prohibition could validly apply. The Court preferred fa-
cial invalidation because it found it unclear how Congress would have
written the statute had a broad ban been unavailable, and because
deciding to whom the ban could validly be applied "would likely raise
independent constitutional concerns whose adjudication is unneces-
sary to decide this case."'1 66
Although NTEU does not use the term "overbreadth," it takes a
different approach than did Arnett to the facial validity of a statute
that could be applied both validly and invalidly. 67 If the employee
can demonstrate a statute's broad chilling effect on speech, that stat-
ute should be facially invalidated under NTEU (even if public em-
162. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
163. See id at 466.
164. Id. at 468.
165. Id. at 473.
166. Id. at 479. As for Arnett, the Court thought that the plurality's opinion merely
"support[ed] a general statute's post hoc application to a single employee's arguably un-
protected speech." Id. at 467 n.12.
167. There can be little doubt that NTEU is about overbreadth even though the Court
did not use the term. When a statute is invalidated on its face even though it is not invalid
in all its applications, it is because of overbreadth, as the author of the NTEU opinion has
elsewhere explained when writing for the Court. See Members of City Council v. Taxpay-
ers For Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796-99 (1984) (summarizing past cases that found statutes
facially invalid due to overbreadth).
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ployers can validly apply it in at least some cases to speech).16 It is
likely, with that much established, that public employees will increas-
ingly escape the problems that Connick poses for them by mounting
overbreadth challenges.'69
A sign of the future in this area is Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley
College.'70 In Cohen, a college disciplined a tenured professor for vio-
lating its sexual harassment policy as a result of a variety of vulgar and
sexually oriented comments that he had made in class. 17 1 The court
invalidated the policy, but did not decide whether Cohen's own com-
ments were protected. It held that the policy's prohibition on conduct
that has the "effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
academic performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offen-
sive learning environment" was likely to reach protected speech and
hence was overbroad.'72 Thus, the question of whether an employee's
own speech is protected under Connick becomes irrelevant if the reg-
ulation is overbroad because the employer has in place no facially
valid policy governing employees' speech.
Ultimately, for a variety of reasons, I do not see a happy future
for Connick and its public concern test. Putting aside its doctrinal
soundness, the test is too difficult to administer and too easy for a
public employee to evade. In the long run, the overbreadth doctrine
is likely to allow public employees to litigate the validity of underlying
employment policies without establishing that their own conduct is
protected. Even though the Court may never formally abandon Con-
nick, its importance is bound to diminish.
168. See generally Charles W. Hemingway, A Closer Look At Waters v. Churchill and
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union: The Constitutional Tensions Between
the Government as Employer and the Citizen as Federal Employee, 44 AM. U.L. Rnv. 2231,
2267-86 (1995). For an early indication of the impact that NTEU is likely to have on facial
challenges to restrictions on workplace speech, see Tucker v. California Dep't of Educ., 97
F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1996); Harmon v. City of New York, 945 F. Supp. 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
169. The precedential value of Arnett is further eroded by the fact that the concurring
Justices declined to join the plurality opinion or explain their reasons for not doing so. See
generally Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-67 (1996) (noting that Court did not
need to strictly adhere to stare decisis value of previous plurality opinion); Nichols v.
United States, 511 U.S. 738, 743-45 (1994) (complaining that previous fractured plurality
opinion confused lower courts)
170. 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1140 (1997).
171. See id. at 970-72.
172. See id. at 972. See also Dambrot v. Central Michigan Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1182-84
(6th Cir. 1995); San Bernadino Pub. Employees Ass'n v. Stout, 946 F. Supp. 790, 799-801
(C.D. Cal. 1996); UMW Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991);
Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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IV. A Solution
The virtue of the Connick public concern test is that it gives both
courts and litigants a doctrinal starting point, a threshold test that pro-
tects managerial prerogatives from inappropriate judicial oversight.
Without the public concern test, the only doctrinal guidance that re-
mains is the free form balancing of Pickering and NTEU. The unpre-
dictability of this balancing should concern public employers and
employees. Additionally, like most balancing tests, it hardly insulates
public employers against overbreadth challenges. If the public con-
cern test is abandoned, or loses practical importance because plaintiffs
are able to circumvent it through overbreadth attack or satisfy it by
altering their own speech, what doctrinal guidance, besides ad hoc bal-
ancing, is available to take its place?
In answering the question, the first step is to identify the types of
legitimate managerial interests in restricting employee speech. The
Court has asked, from Pickering forward, whether an employee's
speech threatens any legitimate managerial prerogative, but has not
announced any governing principle to limit the scope of those prerog-
atives. We know that Constable Rankin could not legitimately insist
that employees spend their time at work discussing only work-related
matters, even though a proscription on such conversations might well
increase office efficiency. We also know that public employees can
sometimes attack their superiors publicly (as in Mt. Healthy) or pri-
vately (as in Givhan) even though this may have an adverse effect on
the employee and supervisor's future working relationships. In con-
trast, Sheila Myers cannot spend her time at the office distributing
questionnaires about office policies, and Cheryl Churchill cannot at-
tack the work of the obstetrics department, even if both satisfactorily
perform all their assigned duties. Although we may intuit a distinc-
tion between the types of managerial prerogatives at stake in these
two lines of cases, there is little in the Court's opinions to explain the
distinction. If employers and employees could identify with reason-
able precision the reach of the managerial prerogatives that employers
may permissibly assert, it would make the law more stable and pre-
dictable in this area.
A. Managerial Prerogatives Over the Content of Employee Speech
I begin with a proposition that the Court has yet to expressly ac-
knowledge, much less incorporate into its jurisprudence in this area:
content discrimination, and even viewpoint discrimination, is permissi-
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ble in public employment.173 I acknowledge this proposition as truth
for two reasons. First, the rationale for strict scrutiny of content and
viewpoint discrimination is inapplicable to the public workplace. Sec-
ond, strict scrutiny of public employers' management of the content
and viewpoints of speech in the workplace is inconsistent with the
very managerial prerogatives that courts aim to preserve.
1. The Scope of Managerial Authority Over Employee Speech.
A central concept in First Amendment jurisprudence is that when
government disapproves of an idea or viewpoint it may not regulate to
inhibit its advocacy; instead, it must allow the marketplace of ideas to
answer offensive viewpoints and ideas with counterspeech. 7 4 Judicial
hostility to content and viewpoint discrimination is a consequence of
this First Amendment imperative. As the Court explained in R.A.V.:
"[t]he rationale of the general prohibition, after all, is that content
discrimination 'raises the specter that the Government may drive cer-
tain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace of ideas.'" 7 5 It is for
this reason as well that the government is not permitted to regulate
speech because of the effects of ideas or viewpoints on listeners. The
answer to offensive speech is thought to be counter-speech rather than
regulation. 176
173. The Court continues to struggle to deny that this is the case. In NTEU, for exam-
ple, the Court argued that the line of cases beginning with Pickering do not tolerate view-
point discrimination:
Our Pickering cases only permit the Government to take adverse action based on
employee speech that has adverse effects on the interest of the State as an em-
ployer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees. That certain messages may be more likely that others to have such
adverse effects does not render Pickering's restriction on speech viewpoint based.
Even a teacher's persistent advocacy in favor of the actions of the school board,
or an employee's exhortation against an attempt on the President's life, could
provide proper grounds for adverse action if the Government could demonstrate
that such expression disrupted workplace efficiency.
513 U.S. 454, 467 n.11 (1995) (emphasis in original). See also id. at 500 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). Whatever the merit of this argument as applied to the Pickering balancing test,
it plainly does not explain how Connick's public concern test could be deemed content-
and viewpoint-neutral.
174. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994); Hustler Maga-
zine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-52 (1987); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-79 (1964).
175. 505 U.S. at 387 (1992) (quoting Simon & Schuster v. Members of New York State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
176. See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 394; Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505
U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1987); Hustler Magazine, 485
U.S. at 55-56. In fact this has likely been settled since at least Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 104 (1943), in which the Court held that the "provocative, abusive, and ill-man-
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These axioms should have no application to the workplace. Gov-
ernment need not rely on counterspeech to deal with an employee
who disagrees with management. A public employee, for example,
may properly prohibit its employees from being "rude to custom-
ers."' 7 7 This is an instance in which a public employer's right to man-
age its workforce, in order to achieve substantive governmental
objectives, necessarily includes the power to manage employees'
speech. Management need not rely on its powers of persuasion in or-
der to implement a rule against rudeness; it is entitled to insist on the
point.
While a prohibition on speech may be content and viewpoint-
neutral, other restrictions on a public employee's speech are not, yet
no one thinks them unconstitutional. In order to maintain the public's
confidence in the evenhandedness of the police, for example, a police
department may insist that officers not use racist or sexist language on
the job. In fact, police departments routinely insist upon this rule
even though it is neither content- nor viewpoint-neutral. Indeed, in
Rankin, the Court was careful to note that McPherson held only a
clerical job and had not publicly advocated the President's assassina-
tion. This surely reflects the Court's recognition that the public ex-
pression of some views is inconsistent with the objectives of a police
department and may be proscribed for just that reason. 78 Similarly,
the President of course can insist that his cabinet members support his
administration's policies and fire those who do not, without running
afoul of the First Amendment.
These examples illustrate, of course, that it is frequently a legiti-
mate managerial prerogative to control employees' speech, including
nered" character of the literature that the petitioners had distributed did not justify its
regulation. See id. at 115-16. See also Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
177. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion). See also NTEU,
513 U.S. at 481 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
178. The Court wrote:
While McPherson's statement was made at the workplace, there is no evidence
that it interfered with the efficient functioning of the office .... In fact, Constable
Rankin testified that the possibility of interference with the functioning of the
Constable's office had not been a consideration in his discharge of respondent
and that he did not even inquire whether the remark had disrupted the work of
the office.
Nor was there any danger that McPherson had discredited the office by making
her statement in public. McPherson's speech took place in an area of work to
which there was ordinarily no public access; her remark was evidently made in a
private conversation with another employee. There is no suggestion that any
member of the general public was present or heard McPherson's statement.
483 U.S. at 389 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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its content or viewpoint. That leads to the larger point. "[M]any of
the most fundamental maxims of our First Amendment cannot rea-
sonably be applied to speech by government employees"'17 9 because
the public workplace is not a marketplace of ideas. As Justice
O'Connor explained in Waters, "[w]hen an employee counsels her co-
workers to do their job in a way with which the public employer dis-
agrees, her managers may tell her to stop, rather than relying on
counter-speech."' 8 Thus, public employers may prohibit their em-
ployees from expressing ideas or views at the workplace when their
expression will interfere with management's implementation of work-
place policies. Ultimately, management may require employees to im-
plement its policies without further complaint, even when those
policies govern what employees write or say.
The observation that "marketplace of ideas" jurisprudence is not
applicable to the workplace explains the outcome in Connick. Sheila
Myers' supervisors were constitutionally entitled to direct her to
spend her time at the office working on those cases to which she was
assigned, rather than debate management's methods of distributing
assignments. That may well be content and viewpoint based regula-
tion of speech; doubtless Myers would not have been fired for spend-
ing a few minutes at the office on a crossword puzzle rather than her
questionnaire. Even so, the district attorney, in running the office as
he sees fit, is entitled to view efforts to provoke dissension at the of-
fice more seriously than other types of infractions. Accordingly, pub-
lic employers may instruct their subordinates to do or to say what is
necessary to accomplish those tasks, even if it involves managing the
content of or viewpoints expressed in their employees' speech. 8 '
179. Waters, 511 U.S. at 672 (plurality opinion).
180. Id.
181. This notion of legitimate managerial prerogatives may well underlay the Court's
decision in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), to uphold a prohibition on the use of
federal family planning funds to provide abortion counseling-plainly a content- and view-
point-based restriction, as the Court acknowledged. Id. at 192. Yet the Court held that this
was a type of "value judgment" that the government may make when it offers public subsi-
dies. See id. at 192-93. The Court already had held that government may permissibly en-
courage childbirth rather than abortion by subsidizing only the former, see Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and thus imposing restric-
tions on what recipients of federal subsidies could say could be characterized as a legiti-
mate governmental prerogative-"to ensure that the limits of the federal program are
observed." 500 U.S. at 193. Thus, Rust seems to rest on a form of managerial preroga-
tive-when government may offer selective subsidies, it may regulate what those who dis-
pense these subsidies say as well as what they do in order to ensure that its policy choice is
respected. See generally Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 168-71
(1996).
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2. The Necessity for Judicial Deference to Managerial Prerogatives
Over Employee Speech.
Judicial deference to public employers' management of the con-
tent and viewpoint of speech is accordingly necessary in order to pre-
serve managerial prerogatives. Strict scrutiny of the type ordinarily
used to judge content-based regulation would inevitably infringe the
managerial prerogatives of public employers. Allowing employees,
for example, to litigate disputes about how to achieve workplace effi-
ciency would permit courts to determine what policies are best for
public employers, effectively nullifying managerial prerogatives. Gov-
ernment management of employees' speech, like its power to manage
the other things that employees do during their workday, is thus
neither constitutionally controversial nor inherently suspect, unless
one believes courts have greater managerial acumen a those who have
been granted managerial authority over public employees.
18 2
B. The Patronage Cases as a Limitation on Managerial Prerogatives
Of course, if management's power to regulate employees' speech
were absolute Marvin Pickering would have lost his case. There was
nothing irrational about his employer's judgment that if teachers
worked to support the board's tax proposals, the public schools would
ultimately be improved. Indeed, in none of the cases in which em-
ployees prevailed could the employer's fear that workplace harmony
and efficiency would be undermined by the employee's speech be
fairly characterized as irrational. These cases instead rest on a recog-
nition that there is a brand of workplace "harmony" that employers
are not permitted to insist upon under the First Amendment. The
political patronage cases helpfully explain just this point.
In its patronage cases, 83 the Court has made clear that public
employers may not penalize employees for their partisan affiliations
or beliefs, "unless the employer can demonstrate that party affiliation
is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the
182. See generally THOMAs I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
567-74 (1970); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitu-
tional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. Rnv. 4, 69-70
(1988); Richard Michael Fischl, Labor, Management, and the First Amendment: Whose
Rights Are These, Anyway?, 10 CARDozo L. Rnv. 729, 739-40 (1989); Robert C. Post,
supra note 80, at 197-201; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L.
REv. 1413, 1503-04 (1989).
183. See O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996); Board of
County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996); Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62
(1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
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public office involved."' 84 Thus, unless an employee holds a position
for which partisan loyalty is an appropriate qualification, "government
may not make public employment subject to the express condition of
political beliefs or prescribed expression." '185 A member of the Presi-
dent's cabinet, where partisan loyalty is required, may, for this reason,
be fired for expressing a view not to the President's liking. Public
employees such as Marvin Pickering (schoolteacher) and Ardith Mc-
Pherson (secretary), however, could not be terminated for ideological
disloyalty. Hence, they had no duty to mold their beliefs to those pre-
ferred by their employers. Marvin Pickering was free to vote as he
pleased in the tax referendum and to tell people why. Ardith McPher-
son was free to detest President Reagan and even to "ride with the
cops and cheer for the robbers."' 86 Neither of them disobeyed any
order of a superior or any managerial directive about how work was
to be performed. The patronage cases illustrate that where partisan
loyalty is not a prerequisite for one's job, the employee is protected
"from discharge based on what he believes."'
87
Unlike the public concern test, the patronage cases provide a bet-
ter rationale for judicial intervention into the management of the pub-
lic workplace.' 88 Furthermore, they far more persuasively explain, far
better than does the public concern test, why the scope of managerial
prerogatives should not be left entirely to the political process. It is
not evident that the political process will not secure the right of public
employees to speak on matters of public concern. The electorate fre-
quently will stand up for whistle-blowers who expose government
fraud and abuse. Also, public employees can seek rights of political
184. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518. See O'Hare Truck Serv., 518 U.S. at 717; Umbehr, 518 U.S.
at 675; Rutan, 497 U.S. at 73-75.
185. O'Hare Truck Serv., 518 U.S. at 717.
186. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187. Branti, 445 U.S. at 515 (footnote omitted). Accord, e.g., O'Hare Truck Serv., 518
U.S. at 717; Rutan, 497 U.S. at 73-75.
188. Indeed, in Pickering the Court anticipated the rationale of the patronage cases
when it concluded that it could not require Pickering to be loyal to its views on questions
of educational finance. 391 U.S. at 571-72. The Pickering opinion used the concept of
"public concern" in order to explain why commanding loyalty to its revenue policies was
not among the legitimate managerial prerogatives of the school board. See id. at 571 ("the
question whether a school system requires additional funds is a matter of legitimate public
concern on which the judgment of the school administration, including the School Board,
cannot, in a society that leaves such questions to popular vote, be taken as conclusive").
More recently, the Court has remarked on the relationship between the patronage cases
and Pickering, and suggested that the distinction between denying employment on the ba-
sis of political affiliation and on the basis of speech may be more apparent than real. See
O'Hare Truck Serv., 518 U.S. at 717-18. See also Board of County Comm'rs, 518 U.S. at
675-76.
PERMISSIBLE CONTENT DISCRIMINATION
expression through collective bargaining. The political process and
collective bargaining alone, however, are far less likely to protect the
right of the ideological nonconformist to remain in government ser-
vice. That right is secured by the patronage cases.18 9
C. The O'Brien Test Applied to Employee Speech
Accordingly, the scope of legitimate managerial prerogatives
should allow public employers to regulate the speech of public em-
ployees if the regulations are reasonably calculated to further a mana-
gerial objective that is itself within the constitutional power of the
government. Regulation, therefore, must be unrelated to the suppres-
sion of those employee's beliefs from whom the government cannot
command partisan loyalty. If that test sounds familiar, it should; it is
in essence the well-known test for "incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms" articulated in United States v. O'Brien.190
There, the Court wrote that an incidental restriction
is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of
the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial gov-
ernmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restric-
tion on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
essential to the furtherance of that interest. 191
Although the final prong of the O'Brien test suggests something
approaching strict scrutiny, subsequent cases make clear that this
prong does not require use of a least restrictive alternative test. In-
stead, it requires courts to uphold restrictions when they promote a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively
absent the regulation and do not proscribe substantially more speech
than necessary to serve that interest.' 92
189. In fact, the patronage cases rely upon, and descend from, the cases where the
Court first rejected Justice Holmes' view of the First Amendment rights of public employ-
ees. These cases held that public employment could not be conditioned on the employee
confining his political affiliations to those the government finds acceptable. See O'Hare
Truck Serv., 518 U.S. 712, 717 (1996); Board of Comm'rs, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996).
190. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
191. Id. at 377.
192. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994); Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689
(1985); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1984). Tur-
ner Broadcasting, Rock Against Racism, and Community for Creative Non-Violence actu-
ally judged regulations of the time, place or manner of speech. See e.g., Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. at 798. The Court made clear, however, that "the O'Brien test 'in the last
analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place or manner restric-
tions" when applied to the relationship between the regulation of speech and the govern-
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While the O'Brien test was formulated to address incidental re-
strictions on speech, it seems equally appropriate for restrictions on
public employees' speech, where the issue is what restrictions a public
employer may permissibly impose as an "incident" of public employ-
ment. If persons who engage in conduct as a necessary part of speech
subject themselves to the government's regulatory powers under the
O'Brien test, there is no reason why public employees, who have sub-
jected themselves to the government's managerial powers should have
their right to free speech judged by different standards. 193
The O'Brien test also provides an intelligible answer to problems
of overbreadth. It will tolerate the necessary imprecision in most em-
ployment policies because it condemns restrictions on speech only
when they are substantially overbroad. A policy prohibiting employ-
ees from being "rude to customers" should be upheld because it is not
intended to suppress ideas but rather to implement a legitimate mana-
gerial objective. In addition, it is sufficiently tailored given the unlike-
lihood that it prohibits substantially more speech than necessary and
the difficulty of promulgating more precise rules. Moreover, if an em-
ployer complies with O'Brien by utilizing policies that do not inhibit
substantially more speech than necessary to achieve a legitimate man-
agerial objective, then, by definition, its policy is not substantially
overbroad. When, however, as in NTEU, a prohibition is substantially
broader than the evil it is designed to address, it will be struck down
on its face.194 In fact, the Court appears to have used the O'Brien test
in NTEU; its holding that an employer not restrict substantially more
ment's justification for the regulation. See id. (quoting Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. at 293).
193. I recognize that some commentators have criticized the O'Brien test as affording
too much deference to the government. See generally Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on
Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTNos L.J. 921
(1993); David S. Day, The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech, 42 U. MiNN. L. REv. 491
(1988); David S. Day, The Hybridization of the Content-Neutral Standards for the Free
Speech Clause, 19 Amiz. ST. L.J. 195 (1987); Michael C. Doff, Incidental Burdens on Fun-
damental Rights, 109 -LHa~v. L. REv. 1175, 1200-10 (1996); Robert A. Post, Recuperating
First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1249, 1260-70 (1995). After Turner Broad-
casting, this criticism may well have less force because the Turner Broadcasting Court
seemed to require greater justification of a restriction on speech than O'Brien had previ-
ously. 512 U.S.. at 664-68. See also id. at 682-83 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Indeed Justice Stevens complained about just that in his separate opin-
ion. See id. at 670-74 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). I do
not wish to defend any particular version of the test for restrictions on speech that can be
imposed when the speech implicates legitimate regulatory interests of the government.
Rather, I want the test for incidental restrictions applied to public employee's speech in the
same manner as it used in other situations.
194. 513 U.S. at 472-79.
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speech than necessary to achieve its legitimate objective comes from
O'Brien, not Pickering. Perhaps an unintended consequence of
NTEU may be a movement of the law in this area toward O'Brien.
There is, of course, a difference between the usual application of
the O'Brien test and its application to public employment. The
O'Brien test is ordinarily applied to content-neutral restrictions on
speech,195 yet that content-neutrality is not required in the public
workplace. Even in the patronage cases, which limit managerial pre-
rogatives, content-neutrality is not a requirement. Under the pa-
tronage cases, employers can manage what their employees say at
work as an incident of their power to execute the legitimate functions
of their office, but they may not attempt to coerce ideological con-
formity in their workforce. The rationale for strict judicial scrutiny is
absent because there is nothing inherently suspect about content-
based regulation of employee speech that is not part of an effort to
coerce ideological conformity. Although using O'Brien to evaluate
content-based regulation of speech may seem a radical modification of
the O'Brien test, that is precisely the direction in which the Court was
headed before it took a misstep in Connick. Two cases from the Octo-
ber 1979 term demonstrate just that. In these two cases, the Court
took its first steps towards setting an outer boundary on employees'
First Amendment rights by using an approach based on O'Brien.
In the first case, Brown v. Glines,196 the Court upheld Air Force
regulations which required members of the service to obtain approval
from their commanders before circulating petitions on Air Force ba-
ses. The Court primarily relied on Procunier v. Martinez,97 a case on
the authority to censor prison mail, which had utilized the O'Brien
test.' 98 Applying that test in Brown, the Court concluded that the reg-
ulations "protect[ed] a substantial government interest unrelated to
the suppression of free expression."' 99 The Court identified that in-
terest as the objective of ensuring that petitions are not circulated con-
taining material that would interfere with good order and discipline or
create possible disruption among troops." Thus, the Court upheld a
195. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 662.
196. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
197. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
198. See id. at 410-12.
199. 444 U.S. at 354.
200. See id. at 354-58. On this point the Court relied primarily on Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828 (1976), which upheld a similar regulation prohibiting distribution of unreviewed
literature on an army base, although that case involved the right of a civilian to obtain
access to the base. In that case, the Court concluded that the potential for unreviewed
literature to disrupt military discipline justified the regulation. See id. at 840.
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content-based restriction on speech not to suppress ideas, but instead
to preserve legitimate managerial prerogatives. Moreover, the Court
justified restriction by reference to the potentially harmful effects of
the petitions itself, which ordinarily is not considered a content-neu-
tral justification for restrictions on speech. °1
The Court's willingness in Brown to uphold a content-based re-
striction on speech surely had something to do with the point that I
made above about the rationale for the prohibition on content dis-
crimination. A military base did not likely strike the Court as a "mar-
ketplace of ideas." Thus, if legitimate managerial prerogatives can
justify content-based restrictions on speech in prisons and military ba-
ses, the same should hold true in public employment, without need of
elaborate public concern and balancing tests.2"2
Less than a month later the Court decided Snepp v. United
States.2°3 In Snepp, the government sued Frank Snepp for breach of
his employment agreement with the Central Intelligence Agency
("CIA").20 4 The agreement restricted him from disclosing classified
information and required him to submit any future writings about the
CIA to the agency for prepublication review. 205 Snepp argued that
since his book contained no classified material, he had breached no
duty of confidentiality. The Court, however, observed that the publi-
cation of unreviewed material always creates a risk that classified ma-
terial or vital national interests will be compromised.0 6 The Court
concluded "a CIA agent's violation of his obligation to submit writ-
ings about the Agency for prepublication review impairs the CIA's
201. See discussion infra.
202. I do not mean to suggest that I find the court's analysis in Brown v. Gilnes unas-
sailable. On the whole I thought the dissent's arguments, finding the military's regulations
unnecessary to maintain good order and discipline, were rather persuasive. 444 U.S. at
368-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Even Justice Brennan, however, thought that the appro-
priate inquiry was whether the regulations were sufficiently tailored to address the mili-
tary's legitimate concerns. See id. That is the correct inquiry, in my judgment, and not
whether Captain Glines' petitions involved a matter of public concern.
203. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
204. See id. at 508.
205. See id. at 507-08.
206. The Court wrote:
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that a former intelligence
agent's publication of unreviewed material relating to intelligence activities can
be detrimental to vital national interests even if the published material is unclassi-
fied. When a former agent relies on his own judgment about what information is
detrimental, he may reveal information that the CIA-with its broader under-
standing of what may expose classified information and confidential sources-
could have identified as harmful.
Id. at 511-12.
ability to perform its statutory duties.120 7 This was also the predicate
for the Court's rejection of Snepp's First Amendment claim, since the
Court found that the CIA had a legitimate interest "ensur[ing], in ad-
vance, and by proper procedures, that information detrimental to na-
tional interest is not published. '20 8
Snepp is criticized for its failure to explain how its holding can be
reconciled with First Amendment jurisprudence. 0 9 The Court identi-
fied, however, an interest unrelated to the suppression of ideas: im-
proving the CIA's ability to ensure that information potentially
damaging to national security not be disclosed until reviewed by the
courts. That is a content-based and probably viewpoint-based restric-
tion, but it directly advances a legitimate governmental interest. Had
the case gone the other way, the agency would have had to invest
greater resources in security measures designed to ensure that agents
would not improperly disclose information.z 0 Surely there is a legiti-
mate governmental interest in avoiding that kind of inefficiency that is
not related to the suppression of ideas as O'Brien uses that concept.211
Brown and Snepp make clear that content-based restrictions are
permissible if justified by legitimate managerial prerogatives. This ap-
proach reconciles the patronage cases with the legitimate managerial
207. Id. at 512.
208. Id. at 513 n.8 (emphasis in original).
209. See, e.g., Howard C. Anawalt, A Critical Appraisal of Snepp V. United States: Are
There Alternatives To Governmental Censorship?, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 697 (1981);
Mary M. Cheh, Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking Freedom of Expres-
sion for Government Employees and the Public Right of Access To Government Informa-
tion, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 690 (1984); Ronald Dworkin, Is the Press Losing the First
Amendment?, N.Y. Rv. oF BOOKs, Dec. 4, 1980, at 49; Judith Schenck Koffler & Bennett
L. Gershman, The New Seditious Libel, 69 CoRN. L. RFv. 816, 845-53 (1984); Jonathan C.
Medow, The First Amendment and the Secrecy State: Snepp v. United States, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 775 (1982); Comment, Snepp v. United States: The CIA Secrecy Agreement and the
First Amendment, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 662 (1981).
210. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,
and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 309, 341-42; Richard A. Epstein,
supra note 182, at 68-69.
211. Indeed the Court took this same approach the following term in Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280 (1981), in which it upheld the revocation of a former CIA agent's passport on the
ground that he had previously disclosed classified information and violated his
preclearance agreement, thereby prejudicing national security. The Court recognized that
the revocation of Agee's passport "rest[ed] in part on the content of his speech" yet held
that Agee's purpose of "obstructing intelligence operations and recruiting of intelligence
personnel" was unprotected. Id. at 308-09. Hence, the government interest in inhibiting
measures that make intelligence operations more difficult and costly was within the consti-
tutional power of government and unrelated to the suppression of ideas. Therefore, the
Court concluded that this interest was an appropriate basis for acting against Agee even
based on the content of his speech. See id.
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prerogatives that the Court acknowledged in Connick. Content-based
restrictions on speech are not only permissible, but also ubiquitous in
the workplace. The central question is not whether the public em-
ployer is trying to restrict the content of its employees' speech, but
whether the employer is trying to control how an employee performs
his job, instead of what the employee believes about his job. Public
employers cannot insist that employees (except for the highest-rank-
ing ones for whom partisan loyalty is an appropriate job qualification)
agree with its views on how government should be run and who
should run it. They can insist, however, that employees' views not
affect the public employer's ability to implement its own management
policies in the workplace.
It is difficult to know why the Court, in Connick, took such a
different approach. Perhaps Brown and Snepp appeared easily distin-
guishable. Brown, for example, is generally thought of as a case about
deference to the unique needs of the military, and Snepp is ordinarily
thought of as a case about the unique needs of the intelligence com-
munity. Nevertheless, both cases address the scope of government's
power to manage the speech of its employees. Although managerial
prerogatives are unusually expansive in the military and intelligence
establishments, that is only a difference of degree from other public
employers. Like the CIA, a police department or a prosecutor's office
is also entitled to insist that its employees respect the confidentiality
of the enormously sensitive information that their employees handle.
A public hospital is equally entitled to insist that employees not make
public statements about patient care that may alarm the public and
deter persons from seeking necessary treatment. Whatever the scope
of legitimate managerial prerogatives at a public workplace, there is
no reason why those prerogatives should be judged by a different
standard than that used in Brown and Snepp.212
Returning the O'Brien "incidental" test would provide a more
focused inquiry that is easier to administer than the more indetermi-
nate approaches used in Connick and Pickering. The question in
every case is whether the employer is simply seeking ideological con-
formity from employees, or if there is some substantial managerial in-
terest in controlling employees' performance that the restriction
212. And indeed courts have been willing to take this approach outside the context of
the military and intelligence establishments. See Weaver v. United States Info. Agency, 87
F.3d 1429, 1439-43 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding prepublication review of speeches and writ-
ings on matters of "official concern" by USIA employees); Zook v. Brown, 865 F.2d 887,
891-92 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding prior approval requirement for commercial endorse-
ments by police officers).
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reasonably advances. Also, such an inquiry, as opposed to Connick
and Pickering, more helpfully explains the outcomes in the decided
cases.
From Pickering to Givhan, the employee had performed the em-
ployer's directives; the employees' only sin was ideological disloyalty.
The problem was not with the employees' work performance, but
rather that the employees held and expressed beliefs contrary to those
approved by their employers. None of these employees held jobs for
which ideological loyalty was a prerequisite as outlined under the pa-
tronage cases. The government had no right to require either Bessie
Givhan to agree with the school's desegregation policies or Marvin
Pickering to support its referendum. These employees could only be
required to implement these policies while on the job. An employee's
disagreement with management's policies might justify management's
fear of dissension and disruption in the workplace. Under the pa-
tronage cases, however, public employees are entitled to disagree
with, and even help defeat, the policies of incumbent management, as
long as they do not do so by insubordination.213
In Rankin as well, the employee was fired for her ideology. The
holding in that case, however, demonstrates an important point that
the O'Brien approach captures much better than either Connick or
Pickering. The Court suggested, as I explain above, that McPherson
could have been fired had she made her remarks in public in a manner
that could have brought discredit on the constable's office. 4 That
suggests that the real problem was that the constable overreacted.
Had he merely warned her to behave discreetly he would not have run
afoul of the First Amendment. O'Brien asks whether the degree of
discipline is reasonably tailored to the managerial interest at stake,
and to that extent, explains the Court's approach quite nicely.
The approach of focusing on whether employee discipline is a suf-
ficiently tailored effort to implement some legitimate managerial pre-
rogative also makes Connick an easy case, although a much different
one from the cases that came before it. The threshold question should
have been whether Sheila Myers held a job for which partisan loyalty
was an appropriate criterion; if so, she could be fired for disloyalty
alone.2" 5 Even if Myers were entitled to First Amendment protection
213. See supra Part II.B.
214. See supra note 178.
215. The circuits that have decided that question thus far have held that an elected
prosecutor's staff can properly be required to display partisan loyalty. See Monks v.
Marlinga 923 F.2d 423, 425-26 (6th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Livas v. Petka, 711 F.2d 798
(7th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Mummau v. Ranck, 687 F.2d 9 (3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
Summer 19981
580 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25:529
from dismissal for disloyalty, her case was no better (putting aside
overbreadth problems she had no fair notice that her questionnaire
could have gotten her fired). As I suggested above, Myers was trying
to resist her new assignment and District Attorney Connick had a le-
gitimate interest in assigning her to whatever task he saw fit, an inter-
est unrelated to the suppression of her views on the point. Myers'
efforts to foment opposition to management's personnel policies
among her colleagues threatened even more directly management's
legitimate interest in being able to implement those policies. Myers'
distribution of her questionnaire not only was an improper use of her
workday, but one that posed a special threat to managerial
prerogatives.
The O'Brien approach also sheds light on the question of what
kind of investigation an employer must perform before disciplining an
employee for her speech (the question decided in Waters v. Churchill).
Justice Scalia powerfully criticized the plurality for identifying little
doctrinal support for imposing procedural rules on public employers.
He correctly observed that prior cases had imposed liability on public
employers only when they had retaliated against an employee on the
basis of her protected speech, not merely because an employer had
made an error about what an employee had in fact said.2 16 Hence, he
rejected the plurality's conclusion that, in the absence of intent to re-
taliate, management's negligence in investigating an employee's com-
ments could give rise to a First Amendment violation.117 O'Brien and
the overbreadth doctrine supply the doctrinal footing for that
conclusion.
An employer that conducts no investigation, or a negligent one,
should lose on overbreadth grounds regardless of whether the em-
ployee's speech was protected. A failure to investigate non-negli-
gently creates a large risk of error, which is likely to penalize a
substantial quantity of protected speech and to create a potent chilling
effect.2 18 On the other hand, O'Brien also answers Justice Stevens'
argument that the plurality's rule of reasonableness does not satisfy
the First Amendment. O'Brien does not require an employer to un-
dertake what is in effect the least restrictive alternative, which would
be to conduct an error-free investigation in order to avoid dismissing
216. 511 U.S. at 686-88 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
217. See id. at 686-89 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
218. The plurality did observe that an employer who does no investigation at all into
what an employee has actually said creates an unduly large risk or error, although it did
not put that concern in terms of overbreadth. See id. at 677-78 (plurality opinion); id. at
683-84 (Souter, J., concurring).
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anyone for what turns out to be protected speech. O'Brien, however,
permits leeway when the government is not proscribing substantially
more speech than necessary given its own legitimate interests, includ-
ing its interest in efficient government operations. Investigations
should be reasonable in scope and duration, but need not be perfect.
A reasonable investigation is not likely to restrict substantially more
speech than is necessary to impose discipline on employees with rea-
sonable efficiency; thus it satisfies O'Brien. Justice Stevens' insistence
that "management get its facts straight" 1 9 requires the employer to
conduct a perfect investigation; and O'Brien simply does not go that
far.
O'Brien also aids in addressing cases like Cohen v. San Bernar-
dino Valley College, where public employers seek to regulate what
they believe to be racist, sexist, or otherwise offensive and inappropri-
ate speech by their employees, an issue that sharply divides the com-
mentators.220 If O'Brien is understood as permitting content-based
regulation when legitimate managerial prerogatives are at issue, and
the government does not seek enforced ideological conformity, then it
effectively answers one of the chief objections to regulations aimed at
ensuring that schools and workplaces do not become hostile working
or learning environments. A governmental objective of maintaining a
harmonious and efficient workplace is legitimate and unrelated to the
219. Id. at 699 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. For the most part, the commentators have not even addressed the special constitu-
tional problems that public employers face when disciplining employees for what they have
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suppression of the employees' ideology. Harassing speech that affects
office morale can proscribed in service of that objective. Nor is it an
illegitimate objective to ensure that public officials not make public
statements that detract from their ability to perform their duties.
Some officials, of course, hold jobs that cannot be performed satisfac-
torily if they make certain types of public statements. A police officer
who is an avowed racist, for example, creates special problems if he is
sent on patrol.221 The requirement of reasonable tailoring will still
leave ample room for litigation. Doubtless some employer's policies
will sweep so broadly that they will merit invalidation on their face or
as applied, especially when they require no culpable mental state for
discipline to be applied. Notwithstanding, at least this approach gives
employers and employees guidance for regulation of this type of
speech.
Finally, what of my friend Officer Smith? There was no claim
that he had violated an articulated managerial prerogative. He did
not, for example, go outside of the chain of command or disclose any
confidential information in order to make his allegations. His com-
plaints about second-hand smoke may not have been couched in
terms that satisfied the public concern test, but the police department
had no managerial interest in retaliating against him (other than to
silence him and others who wished to complain about second-hand
smoke). That interest surely does not pass muster under O'Brien.
Thus, the difference between Connick and O'Brien is more than
academic. By requiring an interest unrelated to suppressing an em-
ployee's beliefs about management, O'Brien is sensitive to managerial
prerogatives as well as the lessons of the patronage cases. Connick,
however, uses public concern as a rough proxy for managerial prerog-
atives and tolerates results quite inconsistent with both the patronage
cases and the overbreadth doctrine. O'Brien also accommodates the
necessary imprecision in workplace rules perhaps more clearly than
does the Pickering balancing test, while requiring employers to iden-
tify the legitimate managerial prerogative that the employee's speech
has threatened.
221. An interesting example of just this problem is provided by Lumpkin v. Brown, 109
F.3d 1498 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 558 (1997), in which the court upheld the
termination of a human rights commissioner because of his outspoken opposition to homo-
sexuality, reasoning that the commissioner's statements created justifiable apprehension
that he would be unable to enforce the human rights ordinance effectively. See id. at 1500-
01.
V. Conclusion
When the state of the law is unsatisfactory for plaintiffs and de-
fendants alike, something is seriously wrong. Yet that is the point we
have reached. Regulation of public employees' speech is governed by
imprecise public concern and balancing tests that would not be toler-
ated in any other area of First Amendment jurisprudence, if for no
other reason than their very imprecision would be thought to imper-
missibly chill the exercise of First Amendment rights. At the same
time, the overbreadth doctrine threatens to make those tests entirely
irrelevant, while providing little guidance about what should take
their place.
Rules of law are always more satisfactory when they acknowledge
the problems that those who are subject to them actually face. The
Connick public concern test, however, does not address any of the real
reasons why public employers have a legitimate basis to manage the
speech of their employees. The Pickering balancing test does take
those reasons into account, but like most balancing tests, it is so im-
precise that it serves neither employers' nor employees' quite legiti-
mate interest in having clear and predictable rules. Indeed, the public
concern test was presumably developed in Connick because the Court
was understandably unhappy about leaving this entire area of the law
to a free-form balancing test. But that test is not the answer either; it
is too difficult to apply, too easily circumvented, and ultimately impos-
sible to reconcile with overbreadth jurisprudence.
The O'Brien test, in contrast, captures the interests of both em-
ployers and employees. It recognizes that coerced ideological con-
formity is what the First Amendment truly forbids in public
employment - - not content or viewpoint discrimination - - and that
government is entitled to insist that its employees not behave in ways
that prevent management from running the workplace as it sees fit. It
recognizes that regulation of speech has to be reasonably tailored so
that protected speech is not unduly chilled. At the same time, though,
O'Brien acknowledges that government cannot perfectly tailor a regu-
lation since the government cannot anticipate every situation where it
will have a legitimate reason to regulate the speech of its employees.
The government must simply do what it can to put employees on fair
notice of what it expects from them. In a case like Cohen v. San Ber-
nardino Valley College, for example, perhaps the court was correct
that a public university cannot employ rules so broad that they could
proscribe everything that a student might find offensive. A public em-
ployer, however, surely cannot be expected to do much more than put
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teachers on notice that if they fail to take reasonable care to avoid
inflicting needless distress on their students, they will be subject to
discipline.
The First Amendment issues that inhere in public employment
illustrate all too well how the problems of the real world inevitably
intrude on constitutional law. Elegant arguments can be made that a
prohibition on content or viewpoint discrimination is at the heart of
the First Amendment, but these arguments are not even remotely
plausible when applied to the public workplace. The courts cannot
possibly develop acceptable doctrine in this area without focusing on
the very real problems for both the employee and the employer. The
employee can speak out only by gambling with her job when the scope
of her protection is unclear. The employer cannot possibly anticipate
every situation in which what its employees say may have repercus-
sions on the ability of people to get their work done as it sees fit. As
this area of the law illustrates all too well, constitutional doctrine sim-
ply does not work unless those who make it are engaged with the
problems of the real world. That is probably worth remembering the
next time the Senate holds a confirmation hearing.
